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PUTTING THE FETUS FIRST – LEGAL
REGULATION, MOTHERHOOD, AND
PREGNANCY
Emma Milne ∗

Abstract
The fetus-first mentality advocates that pregnant women and women
who could become pregnant should put the needs and well-being of their fetuses before their own. As this Article will illustrate, this popular public perception has pervaded criminal law, impacting responses to women deemed to
be the “irresponsible” pregnant woman and so the “bad” mother. The Article
considers cases from Alabama and Indiana in the United States and from
England in the United Kingdom, providing clear evidence that concerns
about the behavior of pregnant women now hang heavily over criminal justice responses to women who experience a negative pregnancy outcome or
who are perceived to have behaved in a way that could result in a negative
outcome. This Article provides a new approach by bringing together a critical assessment of fetal protection laws with theories of motherhood ideologies
and analyzing how such ideologies have resulted in legal developments not
only in the US, where the fetus has been granted legal recognition in most
states, but also in England and Wales, where the fetus continues to have no
legal personality. The Article will conclude that the application of the fetusfirst mentality within criminal law has resulted in dangerous legal developments that challenge women’s rights, while doing little to protect fetuses.
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PUTTING THE FETUS FIRST

I. Introduction
1

Concern over the rights and well-being of the fetus has arguably
become a normal aspect of the modern world. For example, the
mortality rates of both pregnant women and their fetuses/newborn
infants continues to be a focus of national and international health
2
agencies, there are numerous advice guides for the period of
3
pregnancy, and there are continuous revisions to public health messages
4
for pregnant women. This focus on health has resulted in scrutiny of
the behavior of pregnant women, and, more recently, women who may
5
become pregnant, in relation to the impact their behavior may have
6
upon the health of their fetus. Women’s consumption of certain foods,
7
8
9
10
alcohol, cigarettes, and illegal substances, and their rates of obesity,

1. Fetus is not the technically correct term for all periods of gestational development.
Different terms are associated with different periods of development: zygote (at fertilization), blastocyst (at implantation, six to ten days after ovulation), embryo (at
about two weeks), and fetus (from eight weeks until birth). Stephanie Dionne Sherk,
Prenatal Development, in GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHILDREN’S HEALTH 1507, 1507–
09 (1st ed. 2006). I will use the term ‘fetus’ for ease, and, unless specifically stated
otherwise, I am referring to a human developing in the womb from the point of conception until a separate existence from the pregnant woman has occurred.
2. See, e.g., Health Matters: Reproductive Health and Pregnancy Planning, PUB. HEALTH
ENG.,
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/health-matters-reproductivehealth-and-pregnancy-planning/health-matters-reproductive-health-and-pregnancyplanning (last visited May 27, 2019); Maternal Health, UNITED NATIONS
POPULATION FUND, https://www.unfpa.org/maternal-health (last visited May 27,
2019); Maternal, Newborn, Child and Adolescent Health, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://www.who.int/maternal_child_adolescent/maternal/en/ (last visited May 27,
2019).
3. See, e.g., Pregnancy, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/pregnancy/index.html (last visited May 27, 2019); Your Pregnancy and Baby Guide, NAT’L HEALTH SERV., https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/
pregnancy-and-baby/ (last visited May 27, 2019); Pregnancy, OFF. ON WOMEN’S
HEALTH, https://www.womenshealth.gov/pregnancy (last visited May 27, 2019).
4. For example, advice relating to alcohol consumption during pregnancy has changed
substantially in the UK over the last twenty years, and the advice has not always conformed with the latest evidence about the impact of alcohol on the health of the fetus. See Betsy Thom et al., Drinking in Pregnancy: Shifting Towards the “Precautionary
Principle,” in ALCOHOL, DRUGS AND RISK: FRAMING DANGEROUS CLASSES AND
DANGEROUS SPACES: HISTORICAL AND CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 66 (Susanne
MacGregor & Betsy Thom eds., 2020).
5. See, e.g., Planning for Pregnancy, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/preconception/planning.html (last visited May 27, 2019);
Planning Your Pregnancy, NAT’L HEALTH SERV., https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/
pregnancy-and-baby/planning-pregnancy/ (last visited May 27. 2019); Preconception
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levels of stress, certain pre-existing medical conditions, how they
13
14
wear a seat belt, and the level of pollution in the air they breathe are

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

Health, OFF. ON WOMEN’S HEALTH, https://www.womenshealth.gov/pregnancy/
you-get-pregnant/preconception-health (last visited May 27, 2019).
See, e.g., Checklist of Foods to Avoid During Pregnancy, FOODSAFETY.GOV,
https://www.foodsafety.gov/risk/pregnant/chklist_pregnancy.html (last visited May
27. 2019); Food Safety for Pregnant Women, FOODSAFETY.GOV,
https://www.foodsafety.gov/risk/pregnant/index.html (last visited May 27, 2019);
Foods to Avoid in Pregnancy, NAT’L HEALTH SERV., https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/
pregnancy-and-baby/foods-to-avoid-pregnant/ (last visited May 27, 2019); Have a
Healthy Diet in Pregnancy, NAT’L HEALTH SERV., https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/
pregnancy-and-baby/healthy-pregnancy-diet/ (last visited May 27, 2019).
See, e.g., Alcohol Use in Pregnancy, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/fasd/alcohol-use.html (last visited May 27, 2019);
Drinking Alcohol While Pregnant, NAT’L HEALTH SERV., https://www.nhs.uk/
conditions/pregnancy-and-baby/alcohol-medicines-drugs-pregnant/ (last visited May
27, 2019).
See, e.g, Smoking During Pregnancy, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/basic_information/health_effects/pregnancy/index.htm
(last visited May 27, 2019); Stop Smoking in Pregnancy, NAT’L HEALTH SERV.,
https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/pregnancy-and-baby/smoking-pregnant/ (last visited
May 27, 2019).
See, e.g., Substance Use During Pregnancy, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/maternalinfanthealth/
substance-abuse/substance-abuse-during-pregnancy.htm (last visited May 27, 2019);
Illegal Drugs in Pregnancy, NAT’L HEALTH SERV., https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/
pregnancy-and-baby/illegal-drugs-in-pregnancy/ (last visited May 27, 2019).
See, e.g, Overweight and Pregnant, NAT’L HEALTH SERV., https://www.nhs.uk/
conditions/pregnancy-and-baby/overweight-pregnant/ (last visited 27 May 2019);
Weight,
Fertility,
and
Pregnancy,
OFF.
ON
WOMEN’S
HEALTH,
https://www.womenshealth.gov/healthy-weight/weight-fertility-and-pregnancy (last
visited May 27, 2019).
See, e.g., Elizabeth R. Burns et al., Stressful Life Events Experienced by Women in the
Year Before Their Infants’ Births – United States, 2000–2010, 64 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 247 (2015); Healthy Beginnings: Applying All Our Health,
PUB. HEALTH ENG.,
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/healthybeginnings-applying-all-our-health/healthy-beginnings-applying-all-our-health (last
visited May 27, 2019).
See, e.g., Pregnancy Complications, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/maternalinfanthealth/pregnancycomplications.html (last visited May 27, 2019); Pregnant Women and Zika, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/pregnancy/zika/
protect-yourself.html (last visited May 27, 2019); Pregnancy and HIV, Viral Hepatitis,
STD, & TB Prevention, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/nchhstp/pregnancy/Default.htm (last visited 27 May 2019);
Preconception Health, OFF. ON WOMEN’S HEALTH, https://www.womenshealth.gov/
pregnancy/you-get-pregnant/preconception-health (last visited May 27, 2019); Thyroid Disease & Pregnancy, NAT’L INST. DIABETES & DIGESTIVE & KIDNEY DISEASES,
https://www.niddk.nih.gov/health-information/endocrine-diseases/pregnancy-
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just some examples of areas in which advice is given to women who
either are pregnant or may become pregnant in order to ensure the
health of their fetus. The scale and scope of guidance is such that for
many women the advice and subsequent expectation result in the need
15
to alter their lives completely for the period of pregnancy and
16
potentially a substantial period before becoming pregnant. This
expectation of modified behavior can be understood as a “fetus-first
mentality”—the idea that it is perfectly normal and appropriate for a
woman who is pregnant to put the needs and well-being of her fetus
before her own needs and well-being. Such expectations have received
criticism for creating a perspective whereby the life and well-being of a
fetus is given preference and priority over the rights and needs of the
17
pregnant woman and even a woman who is not yet pregnant. Such
concerns about women’s behavior while pregnant take on a new

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

thyroid-disease (last visited May 27, 2019); High Blood Pressure (Hypertension) and
Pregnancy, NAT’L HEALTH SERV., https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/pregnancy-andbaby/hypertension-blood-pressure-pregnant/ (last visited May 27, 2019); Epilepsy and
Pregnancy, NAT’L HEALTH SERV., https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/pregnancy-andbaby/epilepsy-pregnant/ (last visited May 27, 2019); Mental Health Problems and
Pregnancy, NAT’L HEALTH SERV., https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/pregnancy-andbaby/mental-health-problems-pregnant/ (last visited May 27, 2019); Diabetes and
Pregnancy, NAT’L HEALTH SERV., https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/pregnancy-andbaby/diabetes-pregnant/ (last visited May 27, 2019).
Steve Ford, Many Women Maybe Unaware of Correct Seatbelt Use While Pregnant,
NURSING TIMES (May 27, 2019), https://www.nursingtimes.net/news/policies-andguidance/many-women-maybe-unaware-of-correct-seatbelt-use-while-pregnant/
7024459.article; Seat Belt Safety: Pregnancy, CHILDREN’S HOSP. PHILA.,
https://www.chop.edu/pages/seat-belt-safety-pregnancy (last visited May 27, 2019).
Damian Carrington, Air Pollution “As Bad as Smoking in Increasing Risk of Miscarriage,” GUARDIAN (May 27, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2019/jan/11/air-pollution-as-bad-as-smoking-in-increasing-risk-ofmiscarriage.
See Anne Drapkin Lyerly et al., Risk and the Pregnant Body, 39 HASTINGS CTR. REP.
34 (2009) (arguing that advice for women in terms of their everyday behavior is not
based entirely on evidence but is based on the mantra of “better safe than sorry,” even
in cases where evidence does not support the advice being given); see also Thom et al.,
supra note 4.
Zoe Williams, So Now Pregnancy Is a Prize for Women Who Lead a “Good Life,” THE
GUARDIAN (May 5, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2016/may/30/pregnancy-women-public-health-babies.
See, e.g., SUSAN BORDO, UNBEARABLE WEIGHT: FEMINISM, WESTERN CULTURE, AND
THE BODY 71–98 (2003); Wendy Chavkin, Women and the Foetus: The Social Construction of Conflict, in THE CRIMINALIZATION OF A WOMAN’S BODY 193, 194
(Clarice Feinman ed., 1992); Jeffrey P. Phelan, The Maternal Abdominal Wall: A Fortress Against Fetal Health Care?, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 461, 481 (1991); Lealle Ruhl, Liberal Governance and Prenatal Care: Risk and Regulation in Pregnancy, 28 ECON. &
SOC’Y 95, 1077–79 (1999).
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dynamic when considering the implications that these concerns have for
criminal law.
This Article focuses on concerns about the impact of behavior by
pregnant women upon their fetuses and the influence these concerns
have had on criminal law. The implications of societal expectations that
women will put the fetus first are clearly outlined and critiqued by analyzing two types of cases: Killing the fetus and consuming controlled
substances during pregnancy.
This Article will consider cases from Alabama and Indiana in the
United States and England in the United Kingdom. Concerns about the
behavior of pregnant women and women who could become pregnant
have permeated criminal law and now hang heavily over criminal justice
responses to women who experience a negative pregnancy outcome or
who are perceived to have behaved in a way that could result in a negative outcome. In assessing cases from the UK and US, I will illustrate
how perceptions of “good” maternal behavior, which encompasses the
principle of putting the fetus first, have influenced the application of
law. Analyzing cases from different jurisdictions clearly shows the influence of the fetus-first mentality on the creation and application of criminal law.
This Article provides a new approach by bringing together a critical
assessment of fetal protection laws with theories of motherhood ideologies and analyzing how such ideologies have resulted in legal developments not only in the US, where we have seen a clear change of laws,
with fetuses being granted legal recognition in most states, but also in
England and Wales, where the law has been static for almost 100 years
and the fetus continues to have no legal personality.
In England and Wales, a person must be born alive and be a “reasonable creature in rerum natura” in order to be a victim of a crime
18
against a person or a homicide offense. A consequence of the “born
alive rule” is that a fetus does not have legal personality. Instead, it is
18. In rerum natura means “in existence.” EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER
PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 50–51 (1680). To be considered a
person “in existence,” the child must have an existence that is independent of its
mother, meaning it must have been wholly expelled from its mother’s body and be
alive. R. v. Enoch (1833) 172 Eng. Rep. 1089 (KB); R. v. Poulton (1832) 172 Eng.
Rep. 997. The cord and afterbirth need not have been expelled from the mother’s
body, nor do they need to be severed from the child. R. v. Reeves (1839) 173 Eng.
Rep. 724 (KB). The test for independent existence is that the child has an independent circulation and has breathed after birth. See R. v. Handley (1874) 172 Eng. Rep.
1100 (KB); R. v. Wright (1841) 173 Eng. Rep. 1039 (KB); R. v. Brain (1834) 172
Eng. Rep. 1272 (KB).
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conceptualized as a “unique organism,” that is “neither a distinct person
19
separate from its mother nor merely an adjunct of the mother.” Consequently, fetuses have few legal protections prior to the completion of
20
birth that results in a live-born child. Therefore, a pregnant woman or
woman in labor who has acted in a way that resulted in the death of the
21
fetus has not committed a criminal offense, with two exceptions. The
first exception occurs if it can be proven the woman intentionally acted
to end her own pregnancy, in which case the offense of procuring a mis22
carriage has been committed. The second exception is if she intentionally acted to prevent a viable fetus from living, in which case the offense
23
of child destruction may apply. Procuring a miscarriage criminalizes
the ending of a pregnancy at any stage of gestation by any person, and
child destruction makes it an offense to kill a child that is capable of being born alive, once the pregnancy has reached 28 gestational weeks.
Outside of these two offenses, a woman is not legally obliged to protect
24
her fetus from harm and does not owe the fetus a duty of care.
In England and Wales there is one further pregnancy-related
offense relevant to this Article: The offense of concealment of birth,
which prohibits the concealment of the knowledge of a birth through
25
the secret disposal of the body of a child. It is a homicide-related

19. Att’y Gen.’s Reference (No.3 of 1994) [19980] AC 245 (HL) (UK).
20. Signified by complete expulsion from the birth canal, independent circulation, and
breathing after birth. See supra note 18.
21. Att’y Gen.’s Reference, [1998] AC 245 (HL); R. v West (1848) 175 Eng. Rep. 329
(KB).
22. Offenses Against the Person Act 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, § 58 (Eng. & Wales).
23. Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1928, 19 & 20 Geo. 5 c. 34, § 1 (UK & Wales). The
offense was first enacted in the 1920s in response to the belief that women were attempting to escape prosecution under the offenses of procuring a miscarriage or murder by waiting for natural labor to commence, the baby to be partially born, and then
killing the child before its body was completely expelled from the birth canal. In such
instances, no criminal offense had been committed. As such, child destruction was
enacted to close this legal loophole. Donna Cooper Graves, “ . . . In a Frenzy While
Raving Mad”: Physicians and Parliamentarians Define Infanticide in Victorian England,
in KILLING INFANTS: STUDIES IN THE WORLDWIDE PRACTICE OF INFANTICIDE 111
(Brigitte H. Bechtold & Donna Cooper Graves eds., 2006); D Seaborne Davies,
Child-Killing in English Law, 1 MOD. L. REV. 203 (1937). Today, the offense is
mostly used when third-parties (often the partner or ex-partner of the pregnant woman) attack a pregnant woman, resulting in the death of the fetus. Only one instance
of a woman being prosecuted for the offense due to her actions to kill her own fetus
has been recorded. Sally Sheldon, The Decriminalisation of Abortion: An Argument for
Modernisation, 36 OXF. J. LEGAL STUD. 334, 340–42 (2016).
24. CP (A Child) v First-Tier Tribunal (criminal injuries compensation) [2014] QB 459,
479.
25. Offenses Against the Person Act 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. c.100, § 60 (Eng. & Wales).
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offense but does not actually involve the homicide of the child, although
it may be charged concurrently. The child need not be born alive, but if
it is born alive, then it must be dead prior to the concealment of the
26
body. While the offense is punishable by up to two years in prison, an
27
immediate custodial sentence is very rare. Enacted in 1803, the offense
was used to criminalize those women who were suspected of killing their
newborn children, but who could not be proven to have done so due to
28
the difficulties of proving live birth. Today, the offense is rarely
prosecuted with only four convictions between 2010 and 2014, mostly
29
of women who have given birth to the child. Recent analysis of the
offense has concluded that it continues to be used today as it was
historically—to punish women who are suspected of homicide but
30
cannot be proven to have killed their child. There is also evidence to
suggest the offense is used to punish women who transgress traditional
31
gender roles, specifically ideals of motherhood.
The position of the fetus in English and Welsh law contrasts to
most jurisdictions in the United States, despite the United States adher32
ing to the common law principle of the born alive rule until the 1970s.
California was the first state to recognize the fetus as a potential victim
33
of homicide. In 1970 the state legislature amended their homicide law
34
to include the fetus as a possible victim of unlawful killing. This
change in the penal code arose after the Superior Court of California
ruled that Robert Keeler could not be convicted of murder for causing
his pregnant ex-wife, Teresa, to give birth to a stillborn child after he
kneed her in the abdomen while shouting, “I’m going to stamp it out of

26. R. v. May (1867) 16 LT 362 (Eng. & Wales).
27. Emma Milne, Concealment of Birth: Time to Repeal a 200-Year-Old “Convenient StopGap”?, 27 FEM. LEGAL STUD. 139, 140 (2019).
28. MARK JACKSON, NEW-BORN CHILD MURDER: WOMEN, ILLEGITIMACY AND THE
COURTS IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 168–76 (1996); Davies, supra note
23, at 213–16 (1937); Ann R. Higginbotham, “Sin of the Age”: Infanticide and Illegitimacy in Victorian London, 32 VICTORIAN STUD. 319, 327 (1989).
29. Milne, supra note 27, at 140.
30. Id. at 148–51.
31. Id. at 152–58.
32. However, the fetus was recognized in law in specific circumstances, such as the ability
to inherit if born alive after the death of its father. See Dawn Johnsen, The Creation of
Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women’s Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and
Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986).
33. See Katharine B. Folger, When Does Life Begin . . . or End? The California Supreme
Court Redefines Fetal Murder in People v. Davis, 29 U.S.F.L. REV. 237, 237 (1994)
(discussing the development of the California Penal Code to include the fetus as a
potential victim).
34. Id. at 238 n.7.
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35

you.” The law was changed so that a fetus that has passed the embryonic stage (approximately six to eight gestational weeks) could be a vic36
tim of unlawful killing. The law now reads: “Murder is the unlawful
37
killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought.”
38
At least 38 states now have laws protecting fetuses, and at least 29
of these states apply their laws to the early stages of pregnancy, employing language such as “any state of gestation,” “conception,” “fertiliza39
tion,” or “post-fertilization.” Fetuses have been included in penal codes
in a number of different ways across the states. In some states, such as
California, the fetus or “unborn child” has been added as a potential vic40
tim of homicide. In other states the fetus has been defined as a “per41
son” or “human being” so that it is protected by existing laws. Other
states have made it a specific offense to injure or kill a fetus, or to com42
mit “feticide.” Massachusetts is unique in that it is the only state to
43
recognize the fetus as a victim of homicide through case law alone.
Changes to federal law have also been made on this basis, with the Unborn Victims of Violence Act recognizing the fetus as a separate victim
from the pregnant woman if it is killed or experiences bodily injury dur44
ing the commission of a federal crime of violence.
Despite the expansion of criminal law to protect the fetus, in 24
states and in federal law, statutes include “maternal exceptions,” where35. Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 623 (Cal. 1970).
36. Andrew S. Murphy, A Survey of State Fetal Homicide Laws and Their Potential Applicability to Pregnant Women Who Harm Their Own Fetuses, 89 IND. L.J. 847, 878
(2014).
37. CAL. PENAL CODE § 8-187(a) (West 2019).
38. Within the literature, scholars often refer to “fetal homicide laws.” However, as argued here, protection of fetuses stretches beyond homicide offenses, and so I argue
that “fetal protection laws” is a more appropriate term to capture the developments of
law in US states from 1970 onward.
39. State Laws on Fetal Homicide and Penalty-Enhancement for Crimes Against Pregnant
Women, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (May 1, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/
research/health/fetal-homicide-state-laws.aspx.
40. Murphy, supra note 36, at 865.
41. For example, in Kansas, homicide and battery offenses apply to “persons,” which include the “unborn child,” defined as “a living individual organism of the species homo
sapiens, in utero, at any stage of gestation from fertilization to birth.” KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 21-5401, 21-5406, 21-5413, 21-5419, (2019).
42. For example, Louisiana specifies that the offense of feticide is the “killing of an unborn child by the act, procurement, or culpable omission of a person other than the
mother of the unborn child.” LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.5 (2019).
43. State Laws on Fetal Homicide and Penalty-Enhancement For Crimes Against Pregnant
Women, supra note 39; see also Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass.
1984).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2019); 10 U.S.C. § 919a (2019).
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by the law specifically excludes pregnant women from prosecution in
45
relation to their own pregnancy. For example, the Unborn Victim of
Violence Act 2004 states, “Nothing in this section shall be construed to
permit the prosecution . . . of any woman with respect to her unborn
46
child.” Similarly, in four states it would appear unlikely that a pregnant woman would be prosecuted for causing the death of her fetus due
47
to the wording of the legislation. However, other states are silent on
whether or not a pregnant woman could be held liable. This leaves the
possibility of criminal proceedings against women to individual prosecutors, who, evidence would suggest, have demonstrated willingness to ad48
vocate for a broad interpretation of such statutes.
As a consequence of laws protecting fetuses, over 413 women were
arrested, detained, and forced to have medical treatment between 1973
49
and 2005. These arrests and detainments have resulted in forced Cae50
sarean sections, and the arrest and sometime imprisonment of women
51
following the stillbirth or miscarriage of a baby, or after they have not
52
followed medical advice in relation to their pregnancy. Similarly,
women have faced criminal justice involvement in cases where the baby
has been born alive and then died shortly after birth, and medical pro-

45. Murphy, supra note 36, at 865.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(3). See Murphy, supra note 36, for further discussion of maternal exceptions in both federal and state laws.
47. Murphy, supra note 36, at 865–66.
48. Id. at 866.
49. Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant
Women in the United States, 1973–2005: Implications for Women’s Legal Status and
Public Health, 38 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 299, 299–300 (2013) [hereinafter Paltrow & Flavin, Forced Interventions]. An additional 300 cases were documented between 2005 and 2013. Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Are Pregnant Women Persons After 20 Weeks’ Gestation?, REWIRE NEWS (Nov. 15 2013),
http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/11/15/are-pregnant-women-persons-after-20weeks-gestation/.
50. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (Angela Carder was forced to undergo a lifethreatening Caesarean section against her wishes, and the wishes of her family and
doctor, in an unsuccessful attempt to save the life of her fetus).
51. Kevin Hayes, Did Christine Taylor Take Abortion into Her Own Hands?, CBS NEWS
(Mar. 2, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/did-christine-taylor-take-abortioninto-her-own-hands/; Amie Newman, Pregnant? Don’t Fall Down the Stairs, REWIRE
NEWS (Feb. 15, 2010), https://rewire.news/article/2010/02/15/pregnant-dont-falldown-stairs/.
52. Mother Charged in Caesarean Row, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/
americas/3504720.stm (last updated Mar. 12, 2004); Linda Thomson, Mother is
Charged in Stillbirth of a Twin, DESERET NEWS (Mar. 12, 2004),
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/595048573/Mother-is-charged-in-stillbirth-of-atwin.html?pg=all.
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fessionals and law enforcers have deemed that the actions of the birth53
mother while pregnant were the cause of the death of the child. Women have also been imprisoned following a live-born child testing positive
54
for an illegal substance and homicide convictions have been sought in
instances where a pregnancy loss has been believed to be an illegal abor55
tion.
As analysis in this Article will illustrate, the differing legal status of
fetuses across jurisdictions appears to have limited impact on the application of law to criminalize women for behavior deemed to harm or
have potential to harm the fetus. Instead, the perception that a woman
should put her fetus’s needs and well-being before her own needs and
desires—the fetus-first mentality—appears to be driving decisions to
prosecute and apply criminal law. In Part II of this Article, I will outline
the theory of the fetus-first mentality, analyzing what it is, and how it
materializes. Part III will assess four cases in the context of the fetus-first
mentality: Two relating to an illegal termination of a pregnancy, Purvi
Patel in Indiana, US, and Hayley in England, UK, and two relating to
consuming controlled substances in pregnancy, Amanda Kimbrough in
56
Alabama, US, and Sally in England, UK. In Part VI, I will discuss the
implications on fetuses and women of the fetus-first mentality influencing the criminal law.
II. Fetus-first Mentality
The fetus-first mentality is pervasive in both the US and UK. The
principle that the health and welfare of the fetus should be put before
the mother’s has a tangible impact on the behavior of pregnant wom53. People v. Jorgensen, 41 N.E.3d 778, 779 (N.Y. 2015).
54. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2.d 777 (S.C. 1997); Laura Bassett, Judge Tosses Murder
Case Against Mississippi Mom With Stillborn Baby, HUFFPOST (Apr. 3 2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/03/judge-tosses-mississippi-_n_
5086215.html.
55. Liz Hunt, Abortion Most Desperate, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 21 1995),
http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/abortion-most-desperate-1612131.html; Ed
Pilkington, Indiana Prosecuting Chinese Woman for Suicide Attempt that Killed Her
Foetus, THE GUARDIAN (May 30, 2012, 1:36 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2012/may/30/indiana-prosecuting-chinese-woman-suicide-foetus.
56. “Hayley” and “Sally” are not the defendants’ real names. While both cases were heard
in open court, where their names were published, I have anonymized the cases in line
with requirements imposed by the courts to view the cases. The anonymization is of
the identities of the defendants and all other parties involved in the cases and includes
withholding details such as class, exact age, ethnicity, geographical location, and the
court in which the case was heard.
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57

en, with many women making decisions to modify their actions in
58
order to safeguard the health of their unborn child. However, pregnant woman are not the only people who act in ways that prioritize the
well-being of the fetus. As well as influencing social expectations of
women’s behavior while pregnant, the fetus-first mentality also has an
effect on numerous institutions. In this Part I provide an introduction
to the fetus-first mentality and then illustrate how it is linked to motherhood ideologies.
A. Introducing the Fetus-first Mentality
Public health messages that relate to pregnancy are saturated with
the fetus-first mentality in both the US and the UK. For example, in
2016, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) released
guidance about drinking alcohol while pregnant that included the following message, “Sexually active women who stop using birth control
should stop drinking alcohol, but most keep drinking . . . Alcohol can
permanently harm a developing baby before a woman knows she is
59
pregnant . . . The risk is real. Why take the chance?” The guidance,
advocating abstinence from alcohol due to the damage it may cause to
the fetus, targeted not only pregnant women and those planning to conceive, but also women who are not pregnant, and even those who had
no plans to become pregnant. Similarly, in the UK, the National Health
Service of Greater Glasgow and Clyde, Scotland, published a report to
support medical professionals working with women of childbearing age,
advocating that at any time said group of women come into contact
with medical professionals, the professional should ask if there is a rea60
sonable chance the woman will start a pregnancy that year. The guid-

57. Deborah Lupton, “The Best Thing for the Baby”: Mothers’ Concepts and Experiences
Related to Promoting their Infants’ Health and Development, 13 HEALTH RISK & SOC.
637 (2011); Lyerly et al., supra note 15; Ruhl, supra note 17.
58. For example, avoiding certain food and drink or exposure to medication, substances
and situations that may cause harm. S. R. Crozier et al., Do Women Change Their
Health Behaviours in Pregnancy? Findings from the Southampton Women’s Survey, 23
PAEDIATRIC & PERINATAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 446, 446 (2009).
59. More Than 3 Million US Women at Risk for Alcohol-Exposed Pregnancy, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.cdc.gov/media/
releases/2016/p0202-alcohol-exposed-pregnancy.html.
60. JONATHAN SHER, MISSED PERIOD: SCOTLAND’S OPPORTUNITIES FOR BETTER
PREGNANCIES, HEALTHIER PARENTS AND THRIVING BABIES THE FIRST TIME . . . AND
EVERY TIME 32 (2017), http://www.nhsggc.org.uk/media/237840/missed-periods-jsher-may-2016.pdf.
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ance advised that in instances where women answered “yes,” health professionals should encourage women to abstain from harmful substances,
such as alcohol, smoking, and drugs; lose weight; leave violent and abusive partners; and avoid exposure to radiation and illnesses such as HIV,
61
diabetes, rubella, and the Zika virus.
The nature of the initial inquiry into pregnancy status needs to be
examined, with particular attention to the term “reasonable chance.” As
the report acknowledges, approximately fifty percent of pregnancies in
the UK are unplanned; consequently, one reading of this guidance is
that all women of childbearing age (excluding women who have evidence they are infertile) would need to heed the advice, as a woman’s
engagement in sexual activity means there is a reasonable chance she will
62
start a pregnancy. Even women who choose to not engage in sexual activity still have a “reasonable chance” of becoming pregnant, with one in
five women in England and Wales experiencing some type of sexual as63
sault at least once in her lifetime, and one in six American women be64
ing the victim of an attempted or completed rape in her lifetime.
However, it should be noted, that these statistics are likely to underes65
timate the true numbers of victims and survivors of sexual violence.
If read in a more critical light, the guidance can be interpreted as
arguing that pregnancy is a compelling reason for women to become
“healthy” by conforming to the health suggestion, while the state ap-

61. Id.
62. On the basis that even long acting reversible contraceptive methods cannot be said to
be one-hundred percent effective, with a one percent chance of possibility of pregnancy. How Effective is Contraception at Preventing Pregnancy?, NAT’L HEALTH SERV.
(June 30, 2017), https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/contraception/how-effectivecontraception/.
63. Sexual Offenses in England and Wales: Year Ending March 2017, OFF. FOR NAT’L
STAT. (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/
crimeandjustice/articles/sexualoffencesinenglandandwales/yearendingmarch2017. It is
estimated that one in six American women has been the victim of an attempted or
completed rape in her lifetime (14.8 percent completed, 2.8 percent attempted).
Scope of the Problem: Statistics, RAINN, https://www.rainn.org/statistics/scopeproblem (last visited May 10, 2019). However, it should be noted, that these statistics are likely to underestimate the true numbers of victims and survivors of sexual violence. Katrin Hohl & Elisabeth A. Stanko, Complaints of Rape and the Criminal Justice System: Fresh Evidence on the Attrition Problem in England and Wales, 12 EUR. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 324 (2015); Kate B. Wolitzky-Taylor, et al., Reporting Rape in a National Sample of College Women, 59 J. AM. COLL. HEALTH 582 (2011).
64. 14.8 percent completed, 2.8 percent attempted. Scope of the Problem: Statistics,
RAINN, https://www.rainn.org/statistics/scope-problem (last visited May 10, 2019).
65. Hohl & Stanko, supra note 63; Kate B. Wolitzky-Taylor et al., Reporting Rape in a
National Sample of College Women, 59 J. AM. C. HEALTH 582 (2011).
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pears to have fewer concerns about women’s exposure to harms such as
abusive partners or radiation outside of pregnancy. The author of the
report makes positive reference to the increased use of long acting reversible contraception (LARC) by people in Scotland due to the methods being long-lasting and therefore not dependent upon the user re66
membering to use them. One of the key messages from the report is
that health professionals should be “[k]eeping preconception ‘in sight
67
and in mind’ [as it] is the essential catalyst for effective action.” As
such, an inherent suggestion within the report is that men and women
of reproductive age are always in the preconception phase and that
LARC methods are preferable to reduce the chances of unplanned pregnancy—and if the pregnancy is planned then the advice is to become
68
pregnancy-ready by following the guidance outlined above. As LARCs
are only developed for women, the underlying suggestion is that women’s reproduction needs to be controlled through LARCs to manage
their risk of pregnancy and harm that will be done to the fetus due to
the woman’s lifestyle “choices.”
The accepted view that women need to do all they can to be
healthy while pregnant can be traced, in part, to the expectation that a
pregnancy will end with the birth of a healthy, live-born child who will
69
be mothered by the pregnant woman. And yet, a positive outcome of a
pregnancy is neither guaranteed nor predictable. Pregnancy is a highly
medicalized and managed state, regulated and monitored by medical
70
professionals and pregnant women. The development of this medical

66.
67.
68.
69.

SHER, supra note 60, at 8.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Such an expectation has been credited with the “shame” connected to abortion and
miscarriage. See generally, Aalap Bommaraju et al., Situating Stigma in Stratified Reproduction, 10 SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTHCARE 62 (2016) (arguing that stigma surrounding abortion and miscarriage act as barriers to reproductive healthcare); Lesley
Hoggart, Internalised Abortion Stigma: Young Women’s Strategies of Resistance and Rejection, 27 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 186 (2017) (exploring young women’s strategies of
resistance to the stigma surrounding abortion); Anuradha Kumar et al., Conceptualising Abortion Stigma, 11 CULTURE HEALTH & SEXUALITY 625 (2009) (theorizing
abortion stigma, identifying social and political processes that favor the emergence,
perpetuation and normalization of abortion stigma).
70. For more information about the medicalization of pregnancy in the US and the UK,
see generally BARBARA EHRENREICH & DEIRDRE ENGLISH, WITCHES, MIDWIVES, &
NURSES: A HISTORY OF WOMEN HEALERS (2d ed. 2010); JUDITH WALZER LEAVITT,
BROUGHT TO BED (1st ed. 1986); ANN OAKLEY, THE CAPTURED WOMB (1984);
ANN OAKLEY, ESSAYS ON WOMEN, MEDICINE AND HEALTH (1993); RICHARD W.
WERTZ & DOROTHY C. WERTZ, LYING-IN: A HISTORY OF CHILDBIRTH IN AMERICA
(1977).
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intervention and monitoring of pregnancy is, in part, in response to the
71
uncertainty surrounding the outcomes of pregnancy. During the past
150 years, medical knowledge of pregnancy and childbirth has accumulated, resulting in the construction of pregnancy in medical knowledge
72
as a period where two patients are contained within one body. Desire
to protect maternal and fetal life has resulted in checklists of behaviors
that may positively or negatively impact the health and well-being of the
fetus.
Changing expectations of behavior during pregnancy have had
consequences on the lives of pregnant women, who, feminists argue, are
expected to self-manage their own risk of poor outcomes and the risk to
73
their fetus. The development of medical knowledge that constructs the
fetus as a subject distinct from its mother, and responses to that
knowledge, have led many feminists to critique modern obstetric care,
arguing that the fetus has become the focus, the patient, while the preg74
nant woman is perceived as a fetal carrier, incubator, or container. Fur75
ther development of fetal imaging techniques and fetal surgery to di76
rectly treat the fetus have reinforced this critique. Feminists have
argued that such technology and developments frame the fetus as an in77
dependent entity, consequently marginalizing the woman. Furthermore, changing medical perspectives of pregnancy have led to the pregnant woman being constructed as a potential threat to the fetus, and the
71. OAKLEY, THE CAPTURED WOMB, supra note 70, at 220–21.
72. WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 70, at 241–43; see also ROBBIE DAVIS-FLOYD, BIRTH
AS AN AMERICAN RITE OF PASSAGE (1st ed. 1992); CLARE HANSON, A CULTURAL
HISTORY OF PREGNANCY (2004); LEAVITT, supra note 70; Ann Oakley, The Sociology
of Childbirth: An Autobiographical Journey Through Four Decades of Research, 38 SOC.
HEALTH & ILLNESS 689 (2016).
73. Ruhl, supra note 17, at 96.
74. BORDO, supra note 17, at 71–98; EMILY MARTIN, THE WOMAN IN THE BODY: A
CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF REPRODUCTION 54 (1987); ROBYN LONGHURST, BODIES:
EXPLORING FLUID BOUNDARIES 55 (2001); DEBORAH LUPTON, Risk and the Ontology
of Pregnant Embodiment, in RISK AND SOCIOCULTURAL THEORY: NEW DIRECTIONS
AND PERSPECTIVES 59-85 (Deborah Lupton ed. 1999); Wendy Chavkin, Women and
Fetus, 3 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 71 (1992). See generally, IRIS MARION YOUNG,
THROWING LIKE A GIRL AND OTHER ESSAYS IN FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 160–72
(1990).
75. Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Fetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture in the Politics of
Reproduction, 13 FEMINIST STUD. 263, 265–271 (1987).
76. John C. Fletcher, The Fetus as Patient, 246 JAMA 772 (1981); Katherine A. Knopoff,
Can a Pregnant Woman Morally Refuse Fetal Surgery?, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 499 (1991);
Clare Williams, Dilemmas in Fetal Medicine: Premature Application of Technology or
Responding to Women’s Choice?, 28 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 1 (2006).
77. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L. J.
1281, 1309–12 (1991).
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role of fetal protector has been assigned to healthcare professionals who
78
may intercede on its behalf to ensure its well-being and security. Nevertheless, as feminist sociologists Bonnie Fox and Diana Worts have argued, medicalization developed with the endorsement and encouragement of communities of women, many of whom take great comfort in
the support provided by medical institutions during pregnancy, labor,
79
and delivery. However, women’s desire for intervention should not be
accepted without question. Fear of a bad outcome and belief in risk
management strategies are pervasive and embody the everyday experi80
ences of pregnancy and childbirth.
Risk management is the process through which risks are identified,
understood, and evaluated, and processes are enacted to attempt to alleviate, minimize or remove the identified risk. The success of the principles of risk management or risk alleviation rely on people “buying in” to
81
fear and uncertainty. As attempts are made to categorize risk the num82
ber of identifiable risks are highlighted and “discovered.” Therefore,
risk identification is an unfulfilled process; no one can escape the fear of
risk or its impact. While theories of risk management are not exclusive
to pregnancy, pregnancy is one area of life where discourse of risk is particularly pervasive. Risk and risk management strategies are constructed
and communicated through language, practice, and modes of
83
knowledge. While risk is often seen as value-free, using scientific
knowledge that is presented as objective, it is actually value-laden and,
84
specifically for this study, gendered. Risk management works through
85
the governing and regulation of individuals. Within neoliberal society

78. SAMANTHA HALLIDAY, AUTONOMY AND PREGNANCY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
COMPELLED OBSTETRIC INTERVENTION 1–4 (2016); Phelan, supra note 17, at 483–
85.
79. Bonnie Fox & Diana Worts, Revisiting the Critique of Medicalized Childbirth, 13
GENDER & SOC’Y 326 (1999).
80. MARSDEN WAGNER, BORN IN THE USA: HOW A BROKEN MATERNITY SYSTEM MUST
BE FIXED TO PUT MOTHERS AND INFANTS FIRST 104–05, 146–47, 153 (2006).
81. ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY 1–8 (1992).
82. See, e.g., id. at 19–21, 39, 61, 93.
83. Id. at 45–71.
84. See, e.g., Wendy Chan & George S. Rigakos, Risk, Crime and Gender, 42 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 743 (2002); Elisabeth A. Stanko, Safety Talk: Conceptualizing Women’s Risk Assessment as a “Technology of the Soul”, 1 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 479
(1997); Sandra Walklate, Risk And Criminal Victimization: A Modernist Dilemma?,
37 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 35 (1997).
85. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH (Alan Sheridan trans., 1991)
(1977); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOL. 2: THE USE OF
PLEASURE (Robert Hurley trans., 1992) (1985); PAT O’MALLEY, RISK, UNCERTAINTY
AND GOVERNMENT (2004) [hereinafter O’MALLEY, RISK]; Pat O’Malley, Uncertain
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this state management of members of society is not primarily conducted
through force and coercion; instead, it is encouraged through presenta86
tion of the character of the ideal neoliberal subject. This idealized person is prudent and self-regulating, managing their own risk and absorbing the cost of that risk, as opposed to society being required to provide
87
social support. Self-regulation is conducted in line with guidance provided by “experts,” whose advice is supported through “scientific” evi88
dence. When an individual fails to manage their own risk, the state intervenes to control and regulate their behavior through official
89
sanctions.
One of the consequences of the development of risk management
strategies in relation to pregnancy is that there is now no such thing as a
90
no-risk pregnancy. Undoubtedly a tension lies within the dynamic of
pregnancy—two human subjects within one body, both potentially
needing, and, in the case of the woman, desiring different and potentially oppositional treatment or behavior. And yet, as Lealle Ruhl, a feminist political and legal theorist, argues, risk management is not predom91
inantly focused upon averting maternal risk. Instead it is focused upon
reducing possible risk to the fetus that may be caused by the actions of
92
the pregnant woman. The majority of the risk regulation is achieved
through what Ruhl defines as the “liberal governance of pregnancy,”
93
which enlists the cooperation of the “responsible” pregnant woman.

86.
87.
88.
89.

90.
91.
92.

93.

Subjects: Risks, Liberalism and Contract, 29 ECON. & SOC’Y 460 (2000) [hereinafter
O’Malley, Uncertain Subjects]; Nikolas Rose, Government and Control, 40 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 321 (2000); Nikolas Rose, Government, Authority and Expertise in Advanced Liberalism, 22 ECON. & SOC’Y 283 (1993) [hereinafter Rose, Government, Authority, and Expertise]; Jonathan Simon, The Ideological Effects of Actuarial Practices,
22 L. SOC. REV. 771 (1988) (developing Foucault’s theory of governmentality).
See O’Malley, Uncertain Subjects, supra note 85, at 465–66.
Id.
Rose, Government, Authority and Expertise, supra note 85, at 285.
This is done not only through criminal justice sanctions as outlined by criminological
scholars such as O’Malley and evidenced in this Article in relation to pregnancy, but
also through other social institutions such as child protection and removal of children
from the care of their parents and mental health services. Id.; Harry Ferguson, Protecting Children in New Times: Child Protection and the Risk Society, 2 CHILD & FAM.
SOC. WORK 221, 223–25 (1997); Nikolas Rose, Governing Risky Individuals: The
Role of Psychiatry in New Regimes of Control, 5 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 177,
178–80 (1998).
WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 70, at 244; Ruhl, supra note 17, at 102.
Ruhl, supra note 17, at 95–97.
Id.; see also WERTZ-WERTZ, supra note 70; Deborah Lupton, Precious Cargo, 22
CRITICAL PUB. HEALTH 329 (2012); Ilpo Helén, Technics Over Life, 33 ECON. &
SOC’Y 28 (2004).
Ruhl, supra note 17, at 96.
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Ruhl argues that within this context, responsibility is equated with rationality and the principle of the pregnant woman adopting behavior
that will ensure the greatest benefit with the least risk to her unborn
94
child. Pregnancy risk discourse is thus also moralistic, as it is based upon judging women’s actions against ideals of motherhood; risk and
pregnancy cannot be understood outside of the ideal of the “good”
mother and associated behavior and beliefs.
B. Myths of Motherhood
The concept of the “good” mother is fed by what is commonly re95
ferred to in feminist literature as the “myths of motherhood.” A myth
is defined as an uncontested and unconscious assumption that is so
widely accepted that the cultural and historical origins are no longer re96
membered. Thus, mothering is presented as “natural” and “instinc97
tive,” rather than cultural, political, economic, and historical. The
myths of motherhood maintain that to be a woman is to be a mother;
motherhood and mothering is natural, universal, and unchanging for all
98
women. The myths draw on the perception that women are inherently
caring, nurturing, and self-sacrificing and that such behaviors originate
from biology and a woman’s ability to birth children. As the feminist
sociologist Ann Oakley argues, the myths are based on three beliefs,
“that all women need to be mothers, that all mothers need their chil99
dren, and that all children need their mothers.” Furthermore, the
myths insist that, “no woman is truly complete or fulfilled unless she has
kids, that women remain the best primary caretakers of children, and
that to be a remotely decent mother, a woman has to devote her entire

94. Id.
95. See, e.g., ANN DALLY, INVENTING MOTHERHOOD (1982); ANN OAKLEY, BECOMING
A MOTHER (1986).
96. ROLAND BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES 128–45 (Annette Lavers trans. 1993) (1972).
97. SARAH BLAFFER HRDY, MOTHER NATURE: A HISTORY OF MOTHERS, INFANTS, AND
NATURAL SELECTION 363 (2000); Carol Smart, Deconstructing Motherhood, in GOOD
ENOUGH MOTHERING?: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON LONE MOTHERHOOD 37 (Elizabeth Bortolaia Silva ed. 1996); Deirdre D. Johnston & Debra H. Swanson, Invisible
Mothers: A Content Analysis of Motherhood Ideologies and Myths in Magazines, 49 SEX
ROLES 21, 21 (2003).
98. Smart, supra note 97, at 37–40; Paula Caplan, Don’t Blame Mother: Then and Now,
in GENDER AND WOMEN’S STUDIES IN CANADA: CRITICAL TERRAIN, 99–100 (Margaret Helen Hobbs & Carla Rice eds., 2013).
99. ANN OAKLEY, WOMAN’S WORK: THE HOUSEWIFE, PAST AND PRESENT 186 (1974).
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physical, psychological, emotional, and intellectual being, 24/7, to her
100
children.”
The myths saturate society and social and cultural interaction, setting unachievable standards of perfection for women who are mothers
while simultaneously constructing and maintaining popular beliefs that
all women should want to be mothers and the true destiny of a woman
101
is motherhood. These myths hold merit due to the ideologies that
shape popular thoughts and beliefs of mothering. The dominant ideology in a society represents that society’s dominant group: The dominant
group in Anglo-American society is white, heterosexual, middle-class
men. Thus, many feminists have identified the perpetuation of patriar102
chy as the underlying cause of these myths.
The myths that motherhood is natural for women facilitate denying women identities and selfhood outside of mothering and biological
103
reproduction; for example, women’s abilities to access equal levels of
employment as men due to the expectation that they will stay at home
and care for their children. Thus, many feminists have identified the
104
perpetuation of patriarchy as the underlying cause of the myths. Clear
evidence exists to contradict the myths that mothering is natural to
women as not all women mother, and the nurture and care of children
105
is not inevitably or exclusively completed by women. Feminist analysis of motherhood does not lie in and of the fact that the female body
100. SUSAN J. DOUGLAS & MEREDITH W. MICHAELS, THE MOMMY MYTH: THE
IDEALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD AND HOW IT HAS UNDERMINED ALL WOMEN 4
(2005).
101. DALLY, supra note 95; Johnston & Swanson, supra note 97; see generally JOHN R.
GILLIS, A WORLD OF THEIR OWN MAKING 177–78 (1997); E. ANN KAPLAN,
MOTHERHOOD AND REPRESENTATION (1992).
102. Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Social Construction of Mothering: A Thematic Overview, in
MOTHERING: IDEOLOGY, EXPERIENCE, AND AGENCY 1, 9 (Evelyn Nakano Glenn et
al. eds., 1994).
103. See generally SHARON HAYS, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF MOTHERHOOD
1–19 (1996); ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE
AND INSTITUTION 22 (1986); Jane H. Aiken, Motherhood as Misogyny, WOMEN &
LAW 19, 20–21 (2020).
104. See generally Barbara Katz Rothman, Beyond Mothers and Fathers: Ideology in a Patriarchal Society, in MOTHERING: IDEOLOGY, EXPERIENCE, AND AGENCY 139, 151–57
(Evelyn Nakano Glenn et al. eds., 1994).
105. NANCY J. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING (1999); NANCY J.
CHODOROW, FEMINISM AND PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY (1989); Linda Rennie
Forcey, Feminist Perspectives on Mothering and Peace, in MOTHERING: IDEOLOGY,
EXPERIENCE, AND AGENCY 335–76 (Evelyn Nakano Glenn et al. eds. 1994); SARA
RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF PEACE (1998); Adria
Schwartz, Taking the Nature Out of Mother, in REPRESENTATIONS OF MOTHERHOOD
240–55 (Donna Bassin et al. eds. 1994); Rothman supra note 104, at 139–57.
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has the capacity to conceive a child, gestate, give birth, and lactate, or
that some women choose to partake in the nurturing and raising of
children; instead, the issue for consideration is, “[h]ow these biological
106
activities are culturally organized and given meaning.”
The myths construct the notion of the “good” mother, someone
who conforms to the myths, in comparison to the “bad” mother. Today
the “good” mother is the intensive mother; defined as “child-centered,
expert-guided, emotionally absorbing, labor-intensive, and financially
107
expensive.” In contrast, the “bad” mother is identified by her deviant
caregiving practices and failure to conform to the ideal. The line between “good” and “bad” mothering is not fixed or stable, rather it is
108
blurred and it shifts over time and space. While the myths are presented as if from nowhere and no one, they are perceived to be applicable everywhere and to everyone. This is particularly problematic as the
109
myths are not only gendered, but also rooted in class and race. The
ideal “good” mother is based upon the white, middle-class, married,
able-bodied, heterosexual woman who has the exclusive responsibility
for mothering her biological children, focusing her attention solely on
110
their care and well-being. Thus, the further a woman’s identity is situ-

106. Terry Arendell, Conceiving and Investigating Motherhood: The Decade’s Scholarship, 62
J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1192, 1193 (2000).
107. HAYS, supra note 103, at 8.
108. Smart, supra note 97, at 37–57; Shari Thurer, Changing Conceptions of The Good
Mother in Psychoanalysis, 80 PSYCHOANALYTIC REV. 519 (1993).
109. PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE,
CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT (2000) [hereinafter
COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT]; Anne-Marie Ambert, An International Perspective on Parenting: Social Change and Social Constructs, 56 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
529 (1994); Patricia Hill Collins, Shifting the Center: Race, Class, and Feminist Theorizing About Motherhood, in MOTHERING: IDEOLOGY, EXPERIENCE, AND AGENCY
45–66 (Evelyn Nakano Glenn et al. eds. 1994) [hereinafter Collins, Shifting the Center]; Smart, supra note 97.
110. Glenn, supra note 102; Carol Sanger, M is For the Many Things, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN’S STUD. 15 (1992).
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ated from the perceived ideal and the greater her vulnerabilities, the
112
harder it is for her to adhere to the myths.
The construction of the good/bad binary has led scholars to theorize a particular form of gender oppression referred to as “mother113
blame.” Children with problems, or children as problems, are often
linked to the social situations of their mothers (such as poor, unmarried,
divorced, unemployed women) rather than to the social and economic
114
forces that affect children and women’s lives. Similarly, the feelings of
unhappiness or dissatisfaction that women may feel as mothers are attributed to the ill health or failings of the individual mother, rather than
115
the social, political, cultural, and economic systems; a good mother is
a happy mother. Perhaps unsurprisingly, individuals who are furthest
from the white, middle-class mythical mother are more readily deemed
116
to fail. As argued in this Article, when women are deemed to fail, they
may become subject to criminal justice responses. Consequently, poor
women, single women, young women, and women of color are policed
most aggressively and face greater sanctions for their appearance of fail-

111. Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human
Condition, The Essay, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 8 (2008). Fineman defines vulnerabilities as a “universal, inevitable, enduring aspect of the human condition.” However, as all human beings are positioned differently, our vulnerabilities range in terms of
nature, magnitude, and potential. They are also experienced uniquely, and how we
respond to them and are able to manage the negative consequences of our vulnerabilities is dependent upon the quality and quantity of resources that we possess, have access to, and can utilize.
112. Arline T. Geronimus, Damned If You Do: Culture, Identity, Privilege, and Teenage
Childbearing in the United States, 57 SOC. SCI. & MED. 881 (2003); Rickie Solinger,
Race and “Value”: Black and White Illegitimate Babies, 1945–1965, in MOTHERING:
IDEOLOGY, EXPERIENCE, AND AGENCY 287 (Evelyn Nakano Glenn et al. eds. 1994).
113. See generally Paula J. Caplan, Mother-Blaming, in “BAD” MOTHERS: THE POLITICS OF
BLAME IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 127–44 (Molly Ladd-Taylor & Lauri
Umansky eds. 1998); Paula J. Caplan & Ian Hall-McCorquodale, Mother-Blaming in
Major Clinical Journals, 55 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 345 (1985); Anita Ilta Garey
& Terry Arendell, Children, Work, and Family: Some Thoughts on “Mother-Blame,” in
WORKING FAMILIES: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN HOME 293 (Rosanna Hertz & Nancy L. Marshall eds. 2001); Debra Jackson & Judy Mannix, Giving
Voice to The Burden of Blame: A Feminist Study of Mothers’ Experiences of Mother
Blaming, 10 INT’L J. NURSING PRAC. 150 (2004).
114. ANITA ILTA GAREY, WEAVING WORK AND MOTHERHOOD (1999); DOROTHY E.
SMITH, THE EVERYDAY WORLD AS PROBLEMATIC: A FEMINIST SOCIOLOGY (1988);
Arendell, supra note 106.
115. VERTA A. TAYLOR, ROCK-A-BY BABY: FEMINISM, SELF-HELP, AND POSTPARTUM
DEPRESSION 1–58 (1996); Johnston & Swanson, supra note 101, at 30–31.
116. Johnston & Swanson, supra note 97, at 29–30.
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117

ure. This point will become apparent in relation to criminal justice
118
responses to pregnant women deemed to fail to protect their fetus.
One of the specific impacts of the myths of motherhood is that
they result in a conflation between “women” and “mothers,” making
women appear as undifferentiated and unchanging, as opposed to men
119
who appear with historic specificity in a variety of roles and contexts.
Consequently, the myths conflate actors and activities, recognizing only
women or birth mothers as nurturers and caregivers. Furthermore, the
myths conflate children and mothers, denying personhood and agency
to both, and failing to acknowledge that mothers’ and children’s inter120
ests may conflict. The “good” mother is assumed to not be in conflict
with her child or fetus, as, according to the myths, it is in her nature to
121
put her child or fetus’s needs and well-being above her own.
Lack of distinction between mother and child constructed through
myths of motherhood is specifically apparent when considering
pregnancy. The pregnant woman and the fetus are constructed as
intertwined subjects to an even greater extent than a mother and child
who has been born. As noted above, medical developments have
constructed the fetus as a patient distinct from the woman whose body
122
it is within. However, similar to the ideas promoted by the myths of
motherhood, the responsible pregnant woman is expected to put the
needs of her fetus before her own, while the pregnant woman who puts
123
her own needs and desires first is deemed irresponsible. Such
judgments on pregnant women’s behavior go beyond perceptions of
responsibility and connect specifically with the myths of motherhood.
The responsible pregnant woman is the “good” mother; the pregnant
woman who does not put the needs of the fetus before her own needs
and desires is the “bad” mother.
The pressure on women to conform to dominant ideals presented
in the discourse of maternal responsibility is inextricably linked to the
idea of the “responsible mother” who puts the needs of her “child”

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See Smart, supra note 97.
See infra Part III.
Glenn, supra note 102, at 13.
Id.
RACHEL ROTH, MAKING WOMEN PAY: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF FETAL RIGHTS 6
(2000).
122. Id.; BORDO, supra note 17, at 71–98; MARTIN, supra note 74, at 54–67; Chavkin,
supra note 17, at 194; Phelan, supra note 17, at 481; Ruhl, supra note 17, at 107–09.
123. Ruhl, supra note 17, at 109–12.
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first. The myths of motherhood, as they operate on pregnant women
as well as women who have had children, promote and legitimize the
fetus-first mentality. The myths construct expectations of what it means
to be a responsible pregnant woman and allow for, and arguably encourage, placing the fetus’s welfare before the welfare and needs of the
pregnant woman and women who have a chance of becoming pregnant.
Women are deemed to have ultimate responsibility for the fetus and
consequently for its health and development, and so putting the needs
of the fetus before her own is expected. Furthermore, women’s selfregulation and sacrifice are deemed symbols of love and their roles as
125
“good” mothers. In line with the myths of motherhood, few questions
are raised as to whether a woman will sacrifice herself for her child and
by extension her fetus. The construction of this expected maternal sacrifice legitimizes and normalizes the hierarchy of fetal and maternal health
and well-being, and thus, the idea that the pregnant woman will act as
126
the fetus’s most ardent protector. By extension, if she does not, then
she is constructed as the “bad” mother, and consequently others can and
127
must protect the fetus from her. Thus, pregnant women have become
public figures; their bodies have become a display for others to monitor,
touch, and comment upon in ways that would not be appropriate for
128
other adult bodies.
To conclude this Part of the Article, there is no guarantee that a
pregnancy will end with the birth of a healthy, live-born child, and yet
this is the expectation of society, as well as of pregnant women (follow129
ing the decision to not abort the fetus). Awareness that a positive out130
come to a pregnancy is not always the result and it is impossible to
guarantee, is coupled with the perception that the fetus is at risk from

124. Lupton, supra note 57, at 649; see also ROBIN GREGG, PREGNANCY IN A HIGH-TECH
AGE: PARADOXES OF CHOICE (1995); Emma Amanda Harper & Geneviève Rail,
“Gaining the Right Amount for My Baby”: Young Pregnant Women’s Discursive
Constructions of Health, 21 HEALTH SOC. REV. 69 (2012); Michelle R. H. van
Mulken et al., The Stigmatisation of Pregnancy: Societal Influences on Pregnant
Women’s Physical Activity Behaviour, 18 CULTURE HEALTH & SEXUALITY 921 (2016).
125. Harper & Rail, supra note 124, at 74–75.
126. See Danielle Bessett, Negotiating Normalization: The Perils of Producing Pregnancy
Symptoms in Prenatal Care, 71 SOC. SCI. & MED. 370 (2010).
127. HALLIDAY, supra note 78, at 168–69.
128. Lupton, supra note 92, at 332; see also Nathan Stormer, Prenatal Space, 26 SIGNS 109
(2000).
129. Lyerly et al., supra note 15.
130. At least one in four pregnancies end in a miscarriage. Miscarriage Statistics, TOMMY’S,
https://www.tommys.org/our-organisation/charity-research/pregnancy-statistics/
miscarriage (last visited Feb. 8, 2020).
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external factors as well as from the pregnant woman’s behavior. As such,
perception that the fetus is always at risk is now a central aspect of monitoring and intervention in pregnancy; this monitoring and intervention
is most visibly conducted by the medical community. In the UK and
US, pregnant women are screened for their levels of cigarette smoking,
drug use, and alcohol consumption, with the message clearly focused on
131
doing what’s best for the “baby.” However, it is not only the medical
community who monitor and intervene when a pregnant woman is perceived to be an unacceptable risk to the fetus. Examples in both the UK
and the US of doctors seeking court rulings to conduct a Caesarean section against the will of the pregnant woman illustrate that members of
the legal community, in conjunction with or at the behest of members
of the health community, are keen to do all that they can to protect the
132
fetus. At times such protection is given in spite of the damage it may
cause the pregnant woman, both physically and mentally. However, as
evidenced by the cases analyzed in this Article, the fetus-first mentality is
rooted not only in the minds of medics and wider society, but also law
enforcers—including the police, prosecutors, the judiciary, and lawmakers. As the cases examined below illustrate, the desire to protect the fetus
has a strong influence on responses to women deemed to pose risks to
the fetus and to embody the “bad” mother.
III. Fetus-first Mentality in Action
As argued in the previous Part, the fetus-first mentality is entrenched in social and cultural life. In this Part, I will outline the extent
to which the mentality is impacting criminal law. To illustrate this
point, I draw on two examples of behavior—killing of the fetus (feticide) and consuming controlled substances while pregnant—which outline how the fetus-first mentality has influenced the development and
application of laws in response to women’s behavior. I provide cases
from Alabama and Indiana in the US, and England in the UK. What
becomes clear from these cases is that the desire to protect the fetus and
to punish women who failed to put the fetus first has resulted in the development of new laws as well as old laws being stretched beyond the
original intent of enacting legislators. Such adaption of law is not uncommon in criminal law and is arguably a natural development of law

131. See supra notes 7–9.
132. See, e.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (en banc); St. George’s Healthcare
N.H.S. Trust v. S. [1999] Fam 26 (CA) (appeal taken from Eng.).
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in common law jurisdictions. However, the influence of the fetus-first
mentality on the development of law has numerous consequences for
both women and their fetuses, as will be outlined in the Part V of this
Article.
A. Feticide
Killing a child is often seen as one of the most heinous crimes a
133
person can commit. The killing of a fetus, an unborn child, is seen by
many to be an equally hideous crime. Moral and legal debates about
134
abortion continue to rage over 45 years after Roe v. Wade declared
outright abortion bans by US states unconstitutional and the Abortion
135
Act 1967 removed the criminal sanctions for abortion in England and
Wales. A person’s belief as to whether an abortion is the killing of a
child will depend upon the position they take in terms of when life be-

133. This is particularly the case when women kill their own children, as considerable research has noted that women can be judged extremely harshly when they commit filicide, due, in part, to the perception that the behavior is “unnatural” for women and
mothers. Women are alternately presented as being “mad,” an explanation that is often given to support the use of criminal offenses such as infanticide in England and
Wales, as well as other jurisdictions that have such criminal offenses. See generally
MICHELLE OBERMAN & CHERYL L. MEYER, WHEN MOTHERS KILL: INTERVIEWS
FROM PRISON (2008); Susan Ayres, “[N]ot a Story to Pass On”: Constructing Mothers
Who Kill, 15 HASTINGS WOMENS L.J. 39 (2004); Karen Brennan, Murdering Mothers
and Gentle Judges: Paternalism, Patriarchy and Infanticide, 30 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
139 (2018); Arlie Loughnan, The “Strange” Case of the Infanticide Doctrine, 32 OXF.
J. LEGAL STUD. 685 (2012); Emma Milne & Jackie Turton, Understanding Violent
Women, in WOMEN AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: FAILING VICTIMS AND
OFFENDERS? 119 (Emma Milne et al. eds., 2018).
134. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
135. Abortion Act 1967, c. 87, § 1 (Gr. Brit.). The Abortion Act provides exemption
from prosecution under section 58 of the Offenses Against the Person Act if the abortion is performed by a registered medical practitioner in specific therapeutic circumstances, whereby two registered medical practitioners are of the opinion that “the
pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week and that the continuance of the
pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, or injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of
her family,” or “the termination is necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to the
physical or mental health of the pregnant woman,” or “continuance of the pregnancy
would involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman, greater than if the pregnancy
were terminated,” or “that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it
would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped.”
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136

gins and the morality of abortion, a discussion which is beyond the
scope of this Article. Nevertheless, public support for post-viability
137
abortions is noted to be lower than for pre-viability terminations.
Consequently, abortions that take place in the later gestational stage of
pregnancy are often deemed to be more morally dubious, and criminal
laws prohibiting or restricting abortion in both the US and the UK are
138
most often structured towards the post-viability stages. Criminal law
distinguishes between an abortion, the ending of a pregnancy, and feticide, the killing of a fetus. However, as will be outlined in the two cases
136. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION AND
EUTHANASIA (1993); CLARICE FEINMAN, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF A WOMAN’S
BODY (1992); BONNIE STEINBOCK, LIFE BEFORE BIRTH: THE MORAL AND LEGAL
STATUS OF EMBRYOS AND FETUSES (2d ed. 2011); ANN FUREDI, THE MORAL CASE
FOR ABORTION (2016); H. Tristram Engelhardt, The Ontology of Abortion, 84
ETHICS 217 (1974); John Finnis, The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion: A Reply to Judith
Thomson, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 117 (1973); Robert E. Joyce, Personhood and the Conception Event, 52 NEW SCHOLASTICISM 97 (1978); John Thomas Noonan, An Almost
Absolute Value in History, in THE MORALITY OF ABORTION: LEGAL AND HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVES 1 (John Thomas Noonan ed., 1970); Rosamund Scott, Choosing Between Possible Lives: Legal and Ethical ISSUES in Prenatal Screening and Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 26 OXF. J. LEGAL STUD. 153 (2006); Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 37 (1972); Mary Anne Warren, On the
Moral and Legal Status of Abortion, 57 MONIST 43 (1973).
137. A 2011 YouGov poll reported that seventy-six percent of Britons believe abortion
should be legal in most or all circumstances, with only two percent believing abortion
should always be legal. Hannah Thompson & Anthony Wells, Abortion Row,
YOUGOV (Sept. 6, 2011, 3:58 PM), https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articlesreports/2011/09/06/abortion-row. A further poll conducted in 2013 concluded that
only six percent of people wanted to increase the gestation limit for abortion above
24 weeks, with forty percent agreeing to keep the limit at 24 weeks and twenty-eight
percent wishing to reduce the limit to below 24 weeks. Andrew Farmer, Opinions on
Abortion, YOUGO (Feb. 14, 2013, 6:49 AM), https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/
articles-reports/2013/02/14/opinions-abortion. A Gallup poll in the US found that
while sixty percent of Americans support legalized abortion in early pregnancy, only
twenty-eight percent support abortion in the second trimester and thirteen percent in
the third. Sarah McCammom, Americans’ Support For Abortion Rights Wanes As Pregnancy Progresses, NPR (June 13, 2018, 3:08 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/13/
619200865/americans-support-for-abortion-rights-wanes-as-pregnancyprogresses?t=1576933749800.
138. Developments in the US since the election of Donald Trump to the presidency and
changes in the leanings of the Supreme Court have resulted in a number of states
making changes to their abortion laws, creating almost total bans, with the aims of a
court challenge being initiated that will allow the case to progress up to the Supreme
Court and potentially result in Roe v. Wade being overturned. See, e.g., H.B. 314,
2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2019). For information about the impact of such laws, see
Abortion Laws in the US – 10 Things You Need To Know, AMNESTY INT’L (June 11,
2019, 5:35 PM), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/06/abortion-laws-inthe-us-10-things-you-need-to-know/.
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presented, the move towards the fetus-first mentality has blurred the
lines between the two offenses. The cases discussed are those of Hayley
from England, UK, and Purvi Patel from Indiana, US. Both women
purchased and took medication to end a pregnancy after the fetus had
reached the point of viability.
1. Hayley—England, UK

139

Hayley was convicted of procuring a miscarriage after she ordered
misoprostol over the internet and consumed the substance in the late
stages of her pregnancy. The drug is used to start labor and expel the fe140
tus from the uterus. Hayley pleaded guilty to a charge of procuring a
miscarriage and was sentenced to eight years imprisonment. During the
sentencing hearing, the prosecution contended that Hayley took the
misoprostol at or close to the full-term of gestation of her pregnancy. As
noted above, in England and Wales it is a criminal offense for anyone,
including the pregnant woman, to end a woman’s pregnancy at any
stage of gestation unless conducted within the confines of the Abortion
141
Act 1967. Procuring a miscarriage criminalizes the ending of a preg142
nancy rather than the killing of the fetus. Therefore, Hayley’s conviction is not specifically for the behavior of or intention to kill the fetus,
but rather her act of ending her pregnancy. Thus, she was convicted of
an illegal abortion, not a crime against the fetus such as child destruction. In spite of Hayley’s conviction for an illegal abortion, the judge in
Hayley’s case equated her actions to murder several times during her
sentencing hearing. The judge argued that Hayley’s behavior was between unintentional manslaughter and murder in terms of seriousness:
This is not charged as murder, and I would be wrong to treat
it as such, as a matter of law. Equally it is not manslaughter,

139. “Hayley” is not the defendant’s real name. While the case was heard in open court,
where her name was published, I have anonymized the case in line with requirements
imposed by the court to view the case. The anonymization is of the identity of the
defendant and all other parties involved in the case and includes withholding details
such as class, exact age, ethnicity, geographical location, and the court in which the
case was heard. As such no citations to the case are provided in this analysis.
140. Rebecca Allen & Barbara M. O’Brien, Uses of Misoprostol in Obstetrics and Gynecology, 2 REVS. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 159, 159 (2009).
141. Abortion Act 1967, c. 87, § 1 (Gr. Brit.).
142. The offense will still be committed even if the fetus survives in utero or is expelled
alive and survives post-birth. R. v. Cramp [1880] 5 QBD 307 (appeal taken from
Eng. & Wales).
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nor is it akin to it, because the termination here was deliberately caused with a view to terminating the life of an unborn
child. It is not akin to causing death by dangerous driving either, with its maximum sentence of 14 years, but once again
I have to bear in mind the nature of the calculated intentionality here. As matters stand in English law, none of those offenses could be committed in relation to an unborn child,
but the seriousness of the criminality here is that, at whatever
stage life can be said to begin, the child in the womb was so
near to birth that in my judgment all right thinking people
would consider this offense more serious than that of unintentional manslaughter or any offense on the calendar other
than murder.
At several times during the hearing the judge refers to the fetus as a
child, including stating that “[t]his is a child who, on the face of it, prospectively was capable of being born alive in the next few days . . .”, thus
further equating Hayley’s actions to the killing of a live-born child.
Moreover, Hayley was initially sentenced to 12 years imprisonment,
which was reduced by the Court of Appeal, who judged that Hayley’s
culpability lay in her “extinguishing of a life about to begin.”
The rhetoric from both hearings indicates that the focus was upon
Hayley’s actions of ending the life of the fetus rather than on ending her
pregnancy. The distinction is significant as Hayley took the misoprostol
at full-term or very close to full term, which means it is possible that the
child was born alive. Hayley refused to reveal the location of the infant’s
body, and the inability to locate the dead body made it impossible to
determine if the child was born alive. Without concrete evidence of live
or stillbirth, alternative offenses were unable to be used to criminalize
Hayley’s actions—homicide offenses (murder, manslaughter, or infanticide) and child destruction. As noted, homicide is reserved for humans
with legal personality, so it would have been necessary for the prosecu143
tion to prove the child lived a separate existence and then died. Child
destruction requires the opposite, for a child to die before it has
144
achieved a separate existence. The judge in Hayley’s sentencing hearing questioned why child destruction had not been used, while noting it

143. See supra text accompanying notes 18–24.
144. Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5 c. 34 (Eng. & Wales).
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has the same gravity as procuring a miscarriage. During the sentencing
hearing, the prosecution barrister advised that child destruction was not
possible due to the inability to prove stillbirth. Thus, not having the
child’s body as evidence for the case limited the available offenses that
the prosecutors could draw upon to convict Hayley of a crime. As a consequence, the prosecutors used procuring a miscarriage, an offense prohibiting the ending of a pregnancy.
While the distinction between ending a pregnancy and ending the
life of a fetus may appear to be a matter of semantics, it has some very
real consequences for the principle behind and application of the law.
As noted above, the born-alive rule prevents a fetus from being a victim
146
of homicide. And yet, application of the offense of procuring a miscarriage in Hayley’s case appears to be on the basis of criminalizing Hayley’s behavior of killing her fetus rather than ending her pregnancy. As a
consequence, procuring a miscarriage is being used as a proxy homicide
offense, like feticide, capturing the killing of a human in utero or during
labor and delivery. To appreciate the significance of using the offense in
this manner, it is important to look at the historical background of the
offense as well as the contemporary context of legal regulation of abortion.
147
Procuring a miscarriage first became a statutory offense in 1803.
However, there is debate within the historical scholarship as to whether
a woman could be held criminally liable for ending her own pregnancy
prior to the 1861 enactment of the Offenses Against the Person Act.
The historian John Keown has argued that section 58 of the Act only
clarified that the law could be applied to pregnant women who self148
aborted, which had always been a common law offense. Bernard
Dickens, another historian, notes that it is not possible to confirm this
argument due to the infrequency with which women were prosecuted
149
for self-abortion. Other scholars have argued that statutes regulating
abortion enacted before 1861 were more concerned with criminalizing
individuals who caused the death of a woman due to the performance of
an abortion, rather than criminalizing the act of abortion itself. As historian Angus McLaren argues, the wording of the 1803 law related to
145. Both offenses have a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. Offenses Against the
Person Act 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. c.100, § 58 (Eng. & Wales); Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1928, 19 & 20 Geo. 5 c. 34, § 1 (Eng. & Wales).
146. Supra text accompanying note 18.
147. Malicious Shooting or Stabbing Act 1803, 43 Geo. 3 c. 58 (Eng., Wales, & Ire.).
148. JOHN KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS AND THE LAW: SOME ASPECTS OF THE LEGAL
REGULATION OF ABORTION IN ENGLAND FROM 1803 TO 1982 34 (1988).
149. BERNARD M. DICKENS, ABORTION AND THE LAW 20–28 (1966).
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post-quickening abortion, “thereby to murder, or thereby to cause and
150
procure the miscarriage of any woman,” suggests that abortion was
seen as another form of murder in which the woman, not the fetus, was
151
the victim. Limited parliamentary debate occurred with the passing of
152
the Offenses Against the Person Act 1861, so it is unclear why pregnant women were named as potential offenders under this law, which
still operates today. Generally, the literature agrees that the historical
purpose of the law was to prevent or condemn harm from coming to
153
pregnant women and the intentional destruction of fetal life; nevertheless, historian Glanville Williams argues that the former purpose was
of most importance, as the concern was not for the unborn child, but
for the injury done to women as a result of the actions of an unskilled
154
abortion provider.
Beyond the historic legacy of the offense of procuring a miscarriage, contemporary debate about legal regulation of abortion further
draws into question the suitability of using the offense to punish Hayley’s behavior. The continued regulation of abortion within criminal law
has come under political, academic, and public scrutiny in recent years,
155
spearheaded by a campaign for decriminalization. In March 2017, a
Private Members Bill to repeal section 58 of the Offenses Against the
Person Act 1861 passed the first reading in Parliament but failed to progress to a second reading due to the calling of the 2017 General Elec156
tion. In academic literature the case for removal of abortion from

150. Malicious Shooting or Stabbing Act, 1803, 43 Geo. 3c. 58 (Eng., Wales, & Ire.).
151. ANGUS MCLAREN, REPRODUCTIVE RITUALS: THE PERCEPTION OF FERTILITY IN
ENGLAND FROM THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY TO THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 128–29
(1984). Quickening is the point at which a woman first feels the fetus move inside,
typically 15–17 gestational weeks. Id. at 107–11.
152. MALCOLM POTTS ET AL., ABORTION 281–82 (1977).
153. Id.; DICKENS, supra note 149; KEOWN, supra note 148.
154. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 146 (1957).
155. The coalition, WE TRUST WOMEN, http://www.wetrustwomen.org.uk/the-coalition.
(last visited June 11, 2019). We Trust Women is a campaign to decriminalize
abortion across the UK, led by the British Pregnancy Advisory Service and supported
by a range of women’s rights groups, reproductive rights campaigners, and professional bodies, including the Royal College of Midwives, Women’s Aid, Fawcett Society, Maternity Action, the British Society of Abortion Care Providers, Birthrights,
Lawyers for Choice, End Violence Against Women, Equality Now, IPPF European
Network, Voice for Choice, Southall Black Sisters, Alliance for Choice NI, and Doctors for a Woman’s Choice on Abortion.
156. MPs Approve an Early General Election, PARLIAMENT.UK (Apr. 19, 2017),
https://www.parliament.uk/business/news/2017/april/mps-to-vote-on-an-earlygeneral-election/; PMBs at End of a Session, UK PARLIAMENT,
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criminal law has most recently been made by Sally Sheldon, a feminist
legal scholar, who argues that reading the Offenses Against the Person
Act 1861 in conjunction with the Abortion Act 1967 does not result in
the law expressing that abortion is a moral wrong at any stage of gesta157
tion. Instead the law criminalizes the ending of a pregnancy (and likely the ending of the fetus’s life) when that abortion is conducted outside
158
of the Abortion Act 1967. The law considers the termination of a
pregnancy a serious wrong when not carried out under medical supervision “in line with the best medical practice of the 1960s” when abortion
could only be conducted through medical procedure (rather than medication), and illegal abortions posed significant health risks to pregnant
159
women. Furthermore, the law requires two doctors to determine
whether an abortion should go ahead and will not be legal if two doctors
do not agree. This is significant as it means that a woman does not have
a right to an abortion, instead she only has the right to ask two doctors
if they will give her permission to have that abortion. Within this operational context, the Abortion Act provides “socially acceptable” reasons
160
why a woman would be allowed to discontinue a pregnancy. The
message of the law is one of medical paternalism, as women are deemed
to be relatively incapable of making a morally significant decision about
161
pregnancy. Sheldon has long argued that the law has always refused to
recognize that women have a fundamental right to decide to terminate a
162
pregnancy. Instead the law advocates that doctors are the best people
163
to determine if a woman should be allowed an abortion. This legal
regulation is out of step with women being autonomous people with the
164
capacity and rights to make decisions about their bodies.
While abortions obtained outside of the parameters of the Abortion Act 1967 are illegal, there have been very few prosecutions despite

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

164.

https://guidetoprocedure.parliament.uk/articles/3Jzklt7n/pmbs-at-end-of-a-session
(last visited Mar. 11, 2020).
See Sheldon, supra note 23.
Abortion Act 1967, c. 87, § 1 (Gr. Brit.); Offenses Against the Person Act 1861, 24
& 25 Vict. c. 100, § 58 (Eng. & Wales).
Sheldon, supra note 23, at 356.
Id.
Id.
Sally Sheldon, “Who Is the Mother to Make The Judgment?”: The Constructions of
Woman in English Abortion Law, 1 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 3 (1993).
See generally SALLY SHELDON, BEYOND CONTROL: MEDICAL POWER AND ABORTION
LAW (1997) (reflecting that the Abortion Act recognizes an important role for doctors as gatekeepers to abortion services).
Sheldon, supra note 23, at 356–58.
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indication that numerous women commit this offense every year. Evidence of seizures of abortifacients being delivered by mail to women
across the UK would suggest that numerous women are procuring their
own miscarriages outside of medical guidance without facing criminal
166
charges. Similarly, in support of her Bill to decriminalize abortion,
Member of Parliament Diana Johnson presented comments from women who illegally obtained and consumed abortifacients from the organization Women on the Web, none of whom have faced criminal prosecu167
tion. There are numerous reasons why a prosecution may not go
forward, including that the police may be unaware that the offense is being committed and that evidence may be limited. Nevertheless, the ability to track mail and internet searches would facilitate a prosecution for,
168
at the very least, procuring an abortifacient, if not for an illegal abortion. It appears, however, that there is little appetite to prosecute women seeking early medical abortions through illegal means. This is perhaps illustrated by the public outcry following the prosecution of a
woman in Northern Ireland for purchasing abortion medication via the
169
internet. As Sheldon argues, prosecutions tend to be reserved for terminations of pregnancies in the very late stages of gestation and nonconsensual abortions (often involving a third party attacking a pregnant
170
woman). Lack of prosecutions of women who terminate non-viable
pregnancies, which still kills a fetus, would suggest that the criminal law
serves no purpose in regulating such action. As Sheldon concludes,
criminal controls on abortion are outdated and out of step with modern
171
medical science, serving to hinder clinical best practices. Furthermore,
Sheldon argues the law stigmatizes women who need abortions, imposing clinically unwarranted and bureaucratic restrictions on medical prac-

165. See Sheldon, supra note 23, at 342–44, 349.
166. Jane Kirby, Women Turning to Illegal Abortion Pills in Rising Numbers, Charity Warns,
INDEPENDENT (Feb. 15, 2017, 1:17 PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/
home-news/abortion-pill-access-online-illegal-decriminalise-woman-britishpregnancy-advisory-service-danger-a7580566.html.
167. 623 Parl Deb HC (6th Ser.) (2017) col. 26–28 (UK).
168. In England and Wales, procuring drugs to cause an abortion is a criminal offense.
Offenses Against the Person Act 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, § 59 (Eng. & Wales).
169. Belfast Protest Against Prosecution of Northern Ireland Woman who Used Abortion
Drugs Held Outside Public Prosecution Service, BELFAST TELEGRAPH (Apr. 7, 2016,
4:00 PM), https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/belfast-protestagainst-prosecution-of-northern-ireland-woman-who-used-abortion-drugs-heldoutside-public-prosecution-service-34607776.html.
170. Sheldon, supra note 23, at 339-40.
171. Id. at 356.
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tice with no evidence to suggest that it impacts the number of abortions
that take place each year.
While there may be limited public and criminal justice appetite to
prosecute women who illegally terminate pregnancies prior to viability,
support for a woman’s right to choose to terminate a pregnancy receives
172
less public support when the fetus is capable of being born alive. In
Hayley’s case, her pregnancy was so far-advanced that she could have
naturally given birth to a living child. It is possible that following consumption of the misoprostol the child may well have been born alive, as
the drug begins the process of labor rather than killing the fetus. If the
body had been located and live birth had been proven, then Hayley may
have faced a murder charge even if she had not intentionally committed
an act or omission that resulted in the child’s death once it was born
alive—the action of taking the misoprostol may have been enough to
173
indicate intent for murder and so result a homicide conviction.
My aim in reviewing the history of the offense of abortion and the
current context of women’s procurement of miscarriages (legal and illegal) is to argue that application of this law in Hayley’s case indicates the
influence of the fetus-first mentality. In the strictest sense of the law and
interpretation of the offense of procuring a miscarriage, Hayley did engage in the intentional termination of a pregnancy; she acted outside of
the authorization for abortion provided by the Abortion Act 1967, and
so taking misoprostol was illegal. However, this does not mean that we
should understand and interpret Hayley’s actions as an abortion, or that
use of the offense of procuring a miscarriage is the correct means to
criminalize her behavior, if indeed criminalization is appropriate. When
we consider the characteristics of legal abortions that occur in England
and Wales, this case is not comparable to “typical” abortions. Abortion
is a common medical procedure that one in three women in the UK will
174
experience at least once in her lifetime. The vast majority of terminations, nine in ten, are carried out at 12 weeks of gestation or less, and

172. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
173. See Att’y Gen. Reference (No.3 of 1994) [1998] AC 245 (HL) (appeal taken from
Eng.) (indicating that homicide offense may have been committed if a child is born
alive and dies of injuries deliberately inflicted while in utero); EMMA CAVE, THE
MOTHER OF ALL CRIMES: HUMAN RIGHTS, CRIMINALIZATION AND THE CHILD
BORN ALIVE 72–74 (2004).
174. Abortion, NHS, https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/abortion/ (last updated Aug. 17,
2016).
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eighty percent are conducted before the tenth week. Abortions that
occurred at or after the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy (the point of
viability) totaled 289 in 2018, 0.1 percent of the legal abortions that oc176
curred. As per the Abortion Act 1967, these abortions would have occurred to save the life of the pregnant woman, to prevent grave permanent mental or physical injury to the pregnant woman, or due to fetal
abnormalities.
Due to the difference between Hayley’s case and a “typical” abortion, Hayley’s actions should not be seen as procuring a miscarriage but
as an attempt to kill her child—either while it was in utero or following
birth. As I have argued, homicide is precisely the offense the prosecution
and judge at Hayley’s trial appear to be aiming to achieve by using the
offense of procuring a miscarriage, but the limits of the application of
homicide in English law has prevented this. Consequently, prosecutors
have drawn on the law of abortion to punish Hayley for behavior they
believe she has committed but cannot prove; and to convict her despite
the lack of legal doctrine to support such a conviction. The prosecution’s decision to apply legislation prohibiting abortion reflects the fetus-first mentality. The desire to convict Hayley of an offense despite
the inapplicability of existing homicide laws resulted in prosecutors
drawing on other available offenses. While some may argue the creativity of prosecutors is admirable and precisely what the Crown Prosecution
Service should be doing to ensure justice for the fetus that could have
been born alive through natural birth, such application of law stretches
the principles of homicide law in England and Wales and so reflects a
clear movement towards a fetus-first mentality.
2. Purvi Patel—Indiana, US
177

In 2013, Purvi Patel purchased mifepristone and misoprostol
178
online and consumed the drugs to terminate her pregnancy at home.

175. U.K. DEP’T OF HEALTH & SOC. CARE, ABORTION STATISTICS, ENGLAND AND
WALES: 2018 12 (2019), https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/abortionstatistics-for-england-and-wales-2018.
176. Id.
177. See generally Mifepristone (Mifeprex), MEDLINEPLUS, https://medlineplus.gov/
druginfo/meds/a600042.html (last updated May 15, 2016) (noting that mifepristone
causes the placenta to separate from the endometrium and so effectively kills the fetus
in utero); supra note 136 (misoprostol starts labor, expelling the fetus from the uterus).
178. Patel v. State, 60 N.E.3d. 1041, 1043 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
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The gestational stage of her pregnancy was 25 to 30 weeks at the time.
Patel left the body of the aborted fetus in a dumpster near her family’s
180
restaurant. After she experienced substantial bleeding, she went to a
181
hospital emergency room for medical assistance. She advised a doctor
that she had been 10 to 12 weeks pregnant and had missed two peri182
ods. However, based on the size of the umbilical cord still inside her
body and a physical examination, the doctor estimated she had been at
183
least 25 or 26 weeks pregnant.
The doctors pressed Patel to tell them the location of the aborted
184
fetus. After she revealed the location, they notified law enforcement
185
and left the hospital with the aim of saving its life. The body was
found by law enforcement officers. A doctor examined it onsite and
concluded that prior to birth the fetus was viable, appeared normal and
186
healthy, and had developed to approximately 30 gestational weeks.
When questioned by police, Patel stated that she did not perform CPR
187
on the aborted fetus because it was not moving and did not cry. The
forensic pathologist concluded that prior to birth the fetus had reached
approximately 25 gestational weeks and “more likely than not” was born
188
alive and had breathed after birth. However, it should be noted that
the conclusion of live birth was made after performing a lung floating
189
test which has been noted to be unreliable. Forensic pathologist Dr.
Joseph Prahlow concluded that “the possible mechanisms of death were
‘extreme prematurity’” coupled with a lack of essential medical care, hypothermia or hyperthermia due to the aborted fetus’s inability to regulate its body temperature, loss of blood due to the severed umbilical
cord, or asphyxia from being placed in a plastic bag or from items inside
190
the bag that could cover its mouth and nose.”
191
Patel was charged with the class A felony neglect of a dependent.
The prosecutors alleged that Patel failed to provide any medical care for
her aborted fetus immediately after its birth and this failure resulted in
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1043.
Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1046.
Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1046.
Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1046.
Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1046.
Patel v. State, 60 N.E.3d. 1041, 1046 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)
Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1046.
Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1046.
Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1047.
Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1047.
Patel, 60 N.E. 3d at 1047 n.6.
Patel v. State, 60 N.E.3d. 1041, 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1048.
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death. Later, she was also charged with feticide, a class B felony; the
prosecutors alleged that Patel knowingly terminated her pregnancy with
an intention other than to produce a live birth or to remove a dead fe193
tus. At trial, Patel was found guilty as charged; she was sentenced to
imprisonment for thirty years for neglect of a dependent, with twenty
194
years executed and ten years suspended. She was also sentenced to a
195
concurrent executed term of six years for feticide. In 2016 she ap196
pealed both convictions.
Patel appealed her neglect conviction by alleging that the State
failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove the conviction beyond a
197
reasonable doubt. At the time of the events, an individual committed
neglect if, “having the care of a dependent, whether assumed voluntarily
or because of a legal obligation, [they] knowingly or intentionally . . . place the dependent in a situation that endangers the dependent’s
198
life or health.” If that neglect results in the death of the child, then the
199
individual has committed a class A felony. The basis of Patel’s neglect
charge was that she knowingly placed the baby in danger by failing to
200
provide any medical care immediately after birth. Patel’s appeal centered on the causation element of the class A felony, which required
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that her actions resulted in the death
201
of the child. The Court of Appeals agreed with Patel. It ruled that the
State failed to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the baby’s death
could not have occurred but for Patel’s failure to provide medical care
202
immediately after its birth.” While Patel’s acts of deliberately inducing
labor and giving birth without medical assistance were deemed to put
her fetus in a dangerous situation, the offense of neglect only applied to
203
a child born alive. The Court stated, “. . . the plain language of the
neglect statute ‘contemplates only acts that place one who is a depend-

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1048.
Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1048.
Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1048.
Patel v. State, 60 N.E.3d. 1041, 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1048.
Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1048–55.
IND. CODE. § 35–46–1–4(a)(1) (2019).
Id at § 4(b).
Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1048. As Patel accepted that the aborted fetus was born alive I
refer to the aborted fetus as a “baby” or “child” for the remainder of the case analysis.
However, Patel’s case illustrates the challenges of determining language when fetuses
die just prior, during, or shortly after birth.
201. Patel v. State, 60 N.E.3d. 1041, 1048–55 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
202. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1052.
203. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1055.
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ent at the time of the conduct at issue in a dangerous situation—not
204
acts that place a future dependent in a dangerous situation.’” Consequently, it was only her postpartum behavior that could be considered
neglectful. Testimony against Patel was only able to establish that there
was a possibility, rather than a certainty, that Patel’s baby would have
lived but for her failure to provide medical care immediately after birth.
As such, Patel’s conviction for a class A felony of neglect of a dependent
205
was vacated. She was convicted of a class D felony of neglect instead,
206
as the State had proven that she knowingly endangered her baby. This
felony was punishable by imprisonment for six months up to three
207
years.
Patel also appealed her feticide conviction on the basis that the
208
statute did not apply to her conduct. At the time of the termination
of Patel’s pregnancy, the feticide offense read: “A person who knowingly
or intentionally terminates a human pregnancy with an intention other
than to produce a live birth or to remove a dead fetus commits feticide,
209
a Class B felony.” First, Patel appealed on the grounds that the offense
of feticide requires the fetus to die, but her child was born alive. The
Court of Appeal disagreed with this point, arguing that the plain lan210
guage of the statute indicated otherwise. However, they did note that
the language of the feticide statute has constructed “. . . the apparently
absurd outcome [of] a woman being convicted under both the neglect
of a dependent statute, which requires a live infant, and the feticide
211
statute, which does not require a dead infant.”
Patel further appealed the conviction on the basis that her actions
212
were not an act of feticide, but an illegal abortion. Patel maintained
that the feticide statute was not the law that “govern[ed] unlawful abortions; rather, unlawful abortions are governed by the Unlawful Abortion
213
Statute, Ind. Code §16–34–2–7.” The Court of Appeals ruled that
the state legislature had purposefully drawn a clear distinction between
feticide and illegal abortion. It noted that since enactment in 1979, the

204. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1053 (citing Herron v. State, 729 N.E.2d. 1008, 1011 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2000)).
205. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1055.
206. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1055.
207. IND. CODE. § 35–46–1–4 (2019).
208. Patel v. State, 60 N.E.3d. 1041, 1055–62 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
209. IND. CODE. § 35–46–1–4 (2019).
210. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1055.
211. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1056.
212. Patel, 60 N.E. 3d at 1056–57.
213. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1057.
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feticide statute had been used to prosecute third parties who knowingly
terminated pregnancies without the consent of the pregnant woman, of214
ten through use of violence targeted at the woman. Patel’s case was
believed to be the first case of the government using the feticide offense
to prosecute a pregnant woman or anyone else for performing an illegal
215
abortion.
Patel further contended that the legislation prohibiting abortions
not performed under certain specified circumstances was intended to
punish medical professionals, not women who performed their own
216
abortions. The Court of Appeals agreed with Patel’s argument and accordingly overturned her feticide conviction, concluding that the legislature never intended for the feticide statute to apply to pregnant wom217
en. As such, Patel’s case was remanded to the trial court for
resentencing for her conviction of class D felony neglect of a depend218
ent. She was sentenced to imprisonment for 18 months; due to time
219
already served, Patel was released immediately.
Patel’s initial convictions of both a class A felony neglect of a dependent and a class B felony of feticide are examples of the fetus-first
mentality. The prosecutors interpreted preexisting laws to obtain a conviction in order to punish the behavior of a pregnant woman towards
her unborn child, as they deemed this behavior unacceptable. As with
Hayley’s case, the prosecution found ways within existing legislation to
illustrate the perceived wrongfulness of the behavior. Unlike Hayley’s
case, the interpretation of the law—notably the feticide offense—which
went beyond the intent of the state legislature was overturned on appeal.
While Indiana recognizes the fetus as a person able to be the victim of
220
homicide, the penal code protects pregnant women from facing prosecution for ending the life of the fetus through an illegal abortion; in
contrast, under English law, the fetus is not recognized as a distinct legal
subject, and so cannot be a victim of homicide, but women can be held

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Patel v. State, 60 N.E.3d. 1041, 1057–60 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1058.
Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1060–62.
Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1060–62.
Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1062.
Judge Says Purvi Patel Should Be Freed Immediately After Feticide Conviction Overturned, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 31, 2016, 10:19 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
us-news/2016/sep/01/purvi-patel-freed-immediately-feticide-conviction-overturned.
220. See IND. CODE § 35–42–1–1(4)(2019) (“A person who knowingly or intentionally
kills a fetus in any stage of development commits murder, a felony.”).

2020]

PUTTING THE FETUS FIRST

187

criminally liable for an illegal abortion or attempting to end the life of
221
the fetus capable of being born alive.
Nevertheless, the fact that the state brought charges against Patel
and secured a conviction illustrates their desire to punish her for behavior deemed to be unacceptable as a pregnant woman. Prosecutors were
prepared to adapt law beyond the scope envisioned by state legislatures
to facilitate a conviction and subsequent punishment. As the Court of
Appeals argued in Patel’s case, if the legislature wished to consider
women who end their own pregnancies as performing an act of feticide,
222
then they would have made this evident in the statute. However, as
other cases explored in this Article will demonstrate, judicial interpretation can also work to uphold prosecutors’ stretching of offenses, driven
by a fetus-first mentality. As outlined in Part IV of this Article, these judicial efforts have significant implications for fetuses and women.
Hayley and Patel’s cases illustrate the function of the fetus-first
mentality in both the UK and the US. In both cases attempts were
made to use existing legislation to punish the women for their actions of
causing the death of their fetus. In Indiana, the attempt to use the feticide offense ultimately failed following the Court of Appeals’ ruling in
223
Patel’s favor and overturning her conviction for this offense. In England prosecutors were successful, as Hayley was convicted of the offense
of procuring a miscarriage, even though, as I have argued above, Hayley’s actions should be seen as the killing of a fetus rather than procuring
a miscarriage. While different legal means were used and different outcomes achieved, the message is clear: women are expected to adhere to
the fetus-first mentality, to put the needs and well-being of their fetuses
before themselves, even if they do not want the child. Neither Hayley
nor Patel did this, and so their actions were deemed to be those of the
“bad” mother and to require punishment, regardless of whether or not
the law can or should be applied in response to such behavior.
B. Consuming Controlled Substances
As argued above, the fetus-first mentality permeates the advice given to pregnant women, as medical and public health officials regularly
provide guidance as to what substances they should consume, reduce, or
avoid. The impact of women’s consumption of substances on the health

221. See supra text accompanying notes 18–24.
222. Patel v. State, 60 N.E.3d. 1041, 1061–62 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
223. See supra text accompanying notes 202–11.
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of the fetus continues to be a core feature of advice, ranging from what
not to eat, to how food should be cooked, to which vitamins and minerals women should be adding to their diets. It should be noted, however, that medical consensus about the appropriate advice to give pregnant
224
women changes over time.
One area of fierce controversy relates to women’s consumption of
controlled substances such as cigarettes, drugs, and alcohol during pregnancy. The advice given to women about the consumption of controlled
substances and the reports of the impact of such substances on fetal
health demonstrates the focus of medical and public health profession225
als, the general public, and the law on the fetus-first mentality. Media
storms about so-called “crack babies” and the panic over the impact and
consequences of women’s use of certain substances have resulted in general adoption of the principle that cigarette, drug, and alcohol use is bad
226
for fetuses. Thus, there is general public, medical, and political consensus that women must avoid these substances while they are pregnant
227
and arguably during the pre-pregnancy period as well. Perhaps unsur224. For example, in England, the public health message relating to the consumption of
runny or raw eggs was revised in 2016. Runny or raw eggs are now deemed safe for
pregnant women to eat. Raw Eggs Safe for Pregnant Women in UK, Say Food Safety
Experts, THE GUARDIAN (July 26, 2016, 2:39 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2016/jul/26/raw-eggs-safe-for-pregnant-women-in-uk-say-food-safety-experts.
225. See Cecilia Benoit et al., Providers’ Constructions of Pregnant and Early Parenting
Women Who Use Substances, 36 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 252 (2014); Alexana Gaspari, Note, Inheriting Your Mother’s Eyes, Hair, and Drug Addiction: Protecting The
Drug-Exposed Newborn By Criminalizing Pregnant Drug Use, 54 FAM. CT. REV. 96
(2016); Raphaël Hammer & Sophie Inglin, ‘I Don’t Think It’s Risky, But. . .’: Pregnant Women’s Risk Perceptions of Maternal Drinking and Smoking, 16 HEALTH RISK &
SOC’Y 22 (2014); Nicholas Hookway et al., Risk, Morality and Emotion: Social Media
Responses to Pregnant Women Who Smoke, 19 HEALTH RISK & SOC’Y 246 (2017);
Ann Oakley, Smoking in Pregnancy: Smokescreen or Risk Factor? Towards a Materialist
Analysis, 11 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 311 (1989); Lupton, supra note 57; Thom et
al., supra note 4.
226. Crack Babies: Twenty Years Later, NPR (May 3, 2010), https://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=126478643&t=1583491940859. See generally, Lisa Maher, Criminalizing Pregnancy - The Downside of a Kinder, Gentler Nation?, 17
SOCIAL JUSTICE 111 (1990) (arguing that the emergence of “crack pregnancies” as a
public problem needs to be understood in the context of a conservative political
agenda that is concerned with the promotion of “traditional family values” that embodied the principle of “say no” to particular forms of sexual activity and types of
drugs).
227. As noted above, pre-pregnancy health is now a prominent feature of public health
campaigns. See supra notes 57–58; see also Sevilay Temel et al., Evidence-Based Preconceptional Lifestyle Interventions, 36 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REV. 19 (2013); M. Whitworth
& T. Dowswell, Routine Pre-Pregnancy Health Promotion for Improving Pregnancy
Outcomes, COCHRANE DATABASE SYS. REV., Oct. 7, 2009; Thom et al., supra note 4.
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prisingly, such messages have impacted the development and application
of criminal law when pregnant women consume controlled substances.
This section explores cases where women’s consumption of substances
perceived to be harmful has come under legal scrutiny. As illustrated in
the cases below, perceptions that women should not take such drugs are
entwined with the idea of the fetus-first mentality.
1. Amanda Kimbrough—Alabama, US
As outlined above, in a number of states in the US, fetuses are subject to legal protection beyond unlawful killing. One example of such
protection is Alabama’s chemical endangerment offense, which criminalizes a person responsible for a child if they “knowingly, recklessly, or
intentionally [cause] or [permit] a child to be exposed to, to ingest or
inhale or to have contact with a controlled substance, chemical sub228
stance, or drug paraphernalia.” The focus of the law, when introduced
in 2006, was to address the concern that children were being exposed to
dangerous chemicals used in the production of drugs such as metham229
phetamines in so-called “meth labs.” However, the rise in the number
of babies testing positive for drugs at birth has led prosecutors to “[take]
it upon themselves to begin applying the chemical endangerment law in
230
a new manner.”
In 2008, Amanda Kimbrough’s son was born after an emergency
Caesarean section; she was 25 weeks and five days pregnant at the
231
time. Kimbrough’s obstetrician diagnosed her with preterm labor and
occult cord prolapse, which occurs when the umbilical cord descends
232
through the birth canal before the fetus. This condition restricts blood
flow through the umbilical cord. The child, Timmy, was born not
233
breathing and with a low heart rate. He died 19 minutes after birth.
Kimbrough’s urine was screened for drugs and tested positive for meth234
amphetamine, as did Timmy’s blood and a sample of his liver tissue.
The pediatrician who treated Timmy determined that he had died from

228. ALA. CODE § 26–15–3(a)(1) (2019).
229. Rachel Suppé, Note, Pregnancy on Trial: The Alabama Supreme Court’s Erroneous
Application of Alabama’s Chemical Endangerment Law in Ex Parte Ankrom, 7
HEALTH L. & POL’Y BRIEF 49, 51 (2013).
230. Id. at 55.
231. Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d 397, 403 (Ala. 2013).
232. Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d at 403.
233. Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d at 403.
234. Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d at 403.
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235

“respiratory arrest secondary to prematurity.” However, a medical examiner with the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences who performed an autopsy on Timmy concluded that he died from “acute
236
methamphetamine intoxication.” Kimbrough later stated that she had
smoked methamphetamine with a friend three days before she had expe237
rienced labor pains. Kimbrough pleaded guilty to chemical endan238
germent of a child, reserving the right to appeal. The trial court sentenced her to ten years’ imprisonment, the mandatory minimum
239
sentence due to the death of the child.
Prosecutors argued that “child” in the penal code included fetuses
as well as born children, which allowed them to apply the chemical endangerment law to fetuses and bring the charges against Kimbrough.
Kimbrough and Hope Ankrom, a woman convicted of the same offense,
both appealed to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. Ankrom argued that “[t]he plain language of § 26-15-3.2, Ala.Code 1975, shows
that the legislature intended for the statute to apply only to a child, not
a fetus,” and that courts in other states with similar legislation have
ruled that statutes do not apply to prenatal conduct that allegedly harms
240
a fetus. The Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed, arguing that the
plain meaning of the term “child,” as used in the statute, includes an
241
unborn child. Ankrom and Kimbrough appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court, who upheld the ruling that the term ‘child’ was “unam242
biguous” in its inclusion of a fetus. The court went further, ruling
that “adoption of the viability distinction to be inconsistent with the
243
plain meaning of the word “child” and with the laws of this State.”
Consequently, the Alabama Supreme Court rejected the Court of Criminal Appeals’ limited application of the chemical endangerment offense
244
to a viable fetus in Ankrom, and ruled that the statute applied to all
fetuses, regardless of viability, meaning that from the point of concep245
tion a fetus is protected as a “child” under state law.
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Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d at 403.
Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d at 403.
Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d 397, 404 (Ala. 2013).
Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d at 402.
Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d at 403.
Ankrom v. State, 152 So. 3d. 373, 376 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).
Ankrom v. State, 152 So. 3d 373, 376 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).
Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d at 409.
Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d 397, 419 (Ala. 2013).
Ankrom v. State, 152 So. 3d. 373, 376 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).
Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d at 419. The judgement was confirmed in Hicks v.
State, 115 So. 3d 53 (Ala. 2014).
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The convictions of Kimbrough and Ankrom, and the criminalization and punishment of numerous other women prosecuted under the
offense of chemical endangerment (approximately 60 women total be246
tween 2006 and 2012), could be interpreted as justifiable on the basis
that the women have put the welfare of future children at risk. However, such an interpretation fails to consider the practical and legal details
of these cases, all of which point towards prosecutors and the courts being influenced by the fetus-first mentality.
In terms of legal considerations, Rachel Suppé has produced one of
the most coherent analyses of the chemical endangerment offense and
the development of Alabama state law in relation to fetuses. She argues
247
that the courts erred in finding the term “child” was unambiguous.
The Alabama Supreme Court’s decision was based on the reading of two
dictionaries that included “fetus” in the definition, while ignoring the
248
dictionaries that do not. Suppé outlines examples where courts have
discarded the reading of a dictionary due to the conflicting interpreta249
tions between texts, yet this was not done in Ex parte Ankrom. Furthermore, Suppé argues the courts should have considered the four previous attempts made by Alabama’s legislators to amend the chemical
endangerment statute to clarify that the offense applied to both born
250
children as well as fetuses. The attempts indicate that the original
wording in the statute was not definitive and therefore the term child is
ambiguous, because if the term was unambiguous then legislators would
251
not have needed to attempt to clarify it in the legislation. Thus, Suppé
argues, there is an argument that the court’s legal basis is flawed and
that Kimbrough had in fact not committed the offense of chemical en252
dangerment.
On a practical level, use of the law in cases involving fetuses has
been criticized due to the lack of conclusive medical evidence that drug
253
use during pregnancy causes harm to the fetus. In instances where the
246. Ada Calhoun, The Criminalization of Bad Mothers, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 25,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/magazine/the-criminalization-of-badmothers.html.
247. Suppé, supra note 229, at 58.
248. Id. at 59.
249. Id. at 59–60.
250. Id. at 60.
251. Id.
252. See id.
253. See generally DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE,
REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 156–159 (1997); Kylee Sunderlin
& Laura Huss, The Mythology of “Addicted Babies”: Challenging Media Distortions,
Laws, and Policies that Fracture Communities, DIFFERENTAKES, Fall 2014, at 1, 3
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pregnancy ends in a miscarriage or stillbirth, frequently the cause of fetal
death is unknown; drug use cannot be definitively determined as the
254
cause of the death of the fetus. It is generally not possible to determine what impact, if any, substance use had on the well-being of the fetus. With this in mind, the conclusions of prosecutors that a woman
who takes drugs while pregnant is endangering her unborn child becomes unfounded in fact.
There is even more doubt about the soundness of applying the
chemical endangerment offense to pregnant women when considering
the implication of the law on all women of reproductive age. Suppé argues the ruling in Ex parte Ankrom has made it a felony for pregnant
women to take numerous prescription drugs which are legally prescribed
255
to them, regardless of whether the prescription is harmful to the fetus.
The ban would include methadone, the drug often used in the care of
256
opioid-dependent pregnant women. Following the ruling of the Alabama Supreme Court, a woman in the very early stages of pregnancy
who is unaware that she is pregnant could potentially still be committing this offense by consuming the legally prescribed medications be257
cause the law also applies to non-viable pregnancies. While possession
or sale of illegal narcotics is a crime in Alabama, use of those same nar258
cotics is not. Thus, the ruling by the Alabama Supreme Court has
widened the law to capture behavior that is otherwise legal to nonpregnant people. Such an outcome of criminal law illustrates the epitome of gender discrimination, as—generally speaking—only women can

254.

255.
256.
257.
258.

(challenging the crack baby myth and program to sterilize women who use crack cocaine); Marsha Rosenbaum & Sheigla Murphy, Women’s Research and Policy Issues, in
SUBSTANCE ABUSE: A COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK 1075–92 (Joyce H. Lowinson et
al. eds., 2005) (arguing that women who use crack cocaine have been scapegoated
through fetal protection laws related to drug-use to provide political cover for the
larger social issues, such as the failed “post-Reagan social experiment” which cut social welfare programs, and complex social conditions that would require major political change).
See Murphy, supra note 36, at 872. See generally Deborah A. Frank et al., Growth,
Development and Behavior in Early Childhood Following Prenatal Cocaine Exposure: A
Systemic Review, 285 JAMA 1613, 1619 (2001); Kathryn A. Kellett, Miscarriage of
Justice: Prenatal Substance Abusers Need Treatment, Not Confinement Under Chemical
Endangerment Laws, 40 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 455, 458
(2014).
Suppé, supra note 229, at 65.
Id.
It is not clear at what stage of gestation the law would begin to apply—whether from
the moment of fertilization, or upon implantation of the embryo. See supra note 1.
Suppé, supra note 229, at 68.
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259

become pregnant. Thus, the statute punishes women, but not men,
who use either illegal narcotics or lawful medication such as prescription
drugs. As Suppé argues, since the punishment can result in sentences up
to life imprisonment, the gender disparity of the statute is of grave sever260
ity.
Further concern has been raised about the potential for convictions
of pregnant women for chemical endangerment to be the start of further
criminal regulation of behavior, resulting in a slippery slope of criminalization. There is the possibility that it will result in control and regulation of all women of reproductive age, just in case she is pregnant and
261
just in case her activity is harmful to a fetus. Commentators have argued that punishment of one type of “deviant” behavior during pregnancy under the veil of fetal protection makes it possible for the state to
262
progress to punishing women for other acts during pregnancy. For example, it may allow for the State to prosecute women who drink alcohol, smoke cigarettes, eat unhealthily, do not seek prenatal care, drive
recklessly, work at locations that expose them to toxic fumes, or remain
263
in violent and physically abusive relationships.
Further concerns about the criminalization of women who test positive for controlled substances become evident when examining the
trends of the personal characteristics of women who are generally prose264
cuted for these types of offenses. Pregnant women of color, especially
265
black women, and women of low income are overrepresented among
those who have been arrested or subjected to equivalent deprivations of

259. This point is made with full awareness that gender is performative, and that people
who identify as men or do not prescribe to the gender binary can and do become
pregnant. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE xv-xvi (1999); Judith Halberstam,
The Pregnant Man, 65 THE VELVET LIGHT TRAP 77, 77 (2010).
260. Suppé, supra note 229, at 69.
261. Id.
262. Lynn M. Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, Fetal Persons, and the Threat to Roe v. Wade,
62 ALB. L. REV. 999, 1003 (1999); Johnsen, supra note 32, at 605-07; Kellett, supra
note 254, at 455; Kathleen Adams, Chemical Endangerment of a Fetus: Societal Protection of the Defenseless or Unconstitutional Invasion of Women’s Rights, 65 ALA. L. REV.
1353, 1366 (2014).
263. Suppé, supra note 229, at 69.
264. Fineman, supra note 111.
265. E.g. Ira J. Chasnoff et al., The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 322 NEW
ENG. J. OF MED. 1202, 1202 (1990) (finding that black women in Pinellas County,
Florida are reported at a rate ten times higher than white women despite the frequency of a positive result being similar).
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266

liberty. Pregnant women who are deemed to fit the stereotype of
“white trash” are also criminalized at a higher rate than wealthier white
267
women. Convictions are more likely among this demographic for two
reasons. Firstly, public clinics and hospitals that serve low-income women, who are also often from ethnic minority backgrounds, are more like268
ly to comply with drug reporting regulations than private hospitals.
Secondly, doctors are influenced, either consciously or unconsciously,
269
by drug-user profiles, which are based on racial stereotypes. As such,
black women are much more likely to be reported to the police than
270
white women, despite comparable patterns of drug-use. The disparity
of prosecutions and convictions between black and white women and
poor and rich women is significant and has rightly been the focus of
criticism as the application of laws and policies of criminalization reflect
271
discrimination based on race, ethnicity, and class. As Dorothy E.
Roberts, an eminent American scholar of race, gender, and the law, argues, society is much more willing to condone the criminalization of
poor, black women who fail to meet the middle-class ideals of motherhood and thus this demographic of drug-users is more likely to face ar272
rest and prosecution. Consequently, Roberts argues, the criminal jus-

266. Paltrow & Flavin, Forced Interventions, supra note 49, at 311; Paltrow, supra note
262, at 1002; ROBERTS, supra note 253, at 152; Seema Mohapatra, Unshackling Addiction: A Public Health Approach to Drug Use During Pregnancy, 18 WIS. J.L.
GENDER & SOC. 241, 257–58 (2011); Linda C. Fentiman, The New Fetal Protection:
The Wrong Answer to the Crisis of Inadequate Health Care for Women and Children, 84
DENV. L. REV. 537, 551 (2006).
267. Grace Howard, The Limits of Pure White: Raced Reproduction in the
Methamphetamine Crisis, 35 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 373, 394 (2014).
268. Loren Siegel, The Criminalization of Pregnant and Child-Rearing Drug Users, in THE
REDUCTION OF DRUG-RELATED HARM 95, 97–98 (P. A. O’Hare et al. eds. 1992).
269. Id. at 98.
270. Id. at 97.
271. See generally ROBERTS, supra note 253 (arguing that convictions of pregnant women
are based upon the principle of legitimizing fetal rights and that black women are easier targets for criminal justice as their arrests are more palpable for the general public
than the arrest of white women); SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR
AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN (1991) (discussing that mothers from low-income
households and who are living in poverty are criminalized for behavior deemed to
harm fetuses with the justification that the state wants to protect children. However,
at the same time, services that would improve the health and well-being of pregnant
women and their children are being cut); Chasnoff et al., supra note 265 (finding that
despite similar rates of drug use between black and white women during the six
month study, black women were reported at approximately ten times the rate of
white women).
272. ROBERTS, supra note 253, at 150–200. As noted above, idealized images of
motherhood, constructed through the myths of motherhood, are class and race/
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tice system focuses on women whom society deems undeserving of
273
motherhood.
Legal responses to pregnant drug users also reflects US policy relating to the so-called “war on drugs” and the popular view that drug use is
274
a crime, not a medical condition. This approach to drug use persists
despite the World Health Organization and the American Psychiatric
275
Association classifying substance abuse as a disease. In spite of such
classifications, the belief that criminalizing pregnant women who use
controlled substances will act as a deterrent from activity that will harm
the fetus or encourage women who use drugs to quit prior to pregnancy
continues to be held. Public perceptions that women who act in a way
that would hurt a child—whether born or not—deserve to be punished
and/or that punishment will act as a deterrent for others also plays a role
276
in the use of criminal law in these cases. Herein lies the connection to
the fetus-first mentality. The myths of motherhood saturate public perception and encourage the belief that women should put their children—including their unborn children—before themselves. These
myths dictate that the “good” mother would refrain from consuming
controlled substances to protect her child, regardless of the nature or
consequence of use. The state and public expect that, when pregnant, a
woman will manage her fetuses’ risk by following guidance provided by
277
the medical community. In this instance, that means not consuming
controlled substances. Paradoxically, while individual risk factors relating to the behavior and health of the pregnant woman are understood to
have a consequence on the well-being of the fetus, the impact of social
and economic factors on the welfare of pregnant women and their fetuses are disregarded. This disregard for the impact of social and economic
factors occurs despite evidence that, as discussed below, these factors
have as much, if not more, impact on the well-being of the fetus than
278
substance use.

273.
274.
275.
276.

277.
278.

ethnicity biased. Collins, Shifting the Center, supra note 109; COLLINS, BLACK
FEMINIST THOUGHT, supra note 109.
ROBERTS, supra note 253, at 152. See also RICKIE SOLINGER, PREGNANCY AND
POWER: A SHORT HISTORY OF REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS IN AMERICA (2005).
Mohapatra, supra note 266, at 244.
Suppé, supra note 229, at 74.
Adams, supra note 262; Alisha Marano, Punishing Is Helping: An Analysis of the
Implications of Ex Parte Ankrom and How the Intervention of the Criminal Justice
System is a Step in the Right Direction Toward Combating the National Drug Problem
and Protecting the Child, 35 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 113 (2013).
Ruhl, supra note 17, at 103.
BORDO, supra note 17, at 83–4; Karen Lane, The Medical Model of the Body as a Site
of Risk: A Case Study of Childbirth, in SOCIOLOGY OF THE BODY: A READER 157
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As outlined in Part II, medical conceptualization of the fetus as a
separate patient has led to the pregnant woman being seen as a potential
threat to the fetus, and thus the fetus’s security needs to be managed by
279
third parties. Criminal cases such as Kimbrough and Ankrom’s suggest that when self-management of the fetus’s risk is perceived to not be
completed by a pregnant woman, some women become subject to institutions that will manage the risk for them. In Kimbrough and Ankrom’s
instances, the criminal justice system stepped in to manage the perceived
risk that they pose as mothers to children due to their drug use. In this
280
instance criminal justice acts as a crime control mechanism. Through
identification of behavior considered risky through a criminal conviction, society is able to manage risk that women such as Kimbrough and
Ankrom may pose to a future fetus. Kimbrough is controlled physically
through her imprisonment, meaning that it is unlikely that she will become pregnant in the near future. While Ankrom was not imprisoned,
her conviction means that she is potentially more likely to be monitored
by child protective services and health professionals if she becomes
281
pregnant again, as with other women who are “drug-affected.” As
such, these cases suggest that feminist theorists have correctly identified
that the fetus is the focus of intervention in pregnancy, rather than the
282
general health and well-being of the woman.

279.
280.

281.
282.

(Jacqueline Low & Claudia Malacrida eds., 2008); Chavkin, supra note 17, at 147;
Ellen S. Lazarus, What Do Women Want?: Issues of Choice, Control, and Class in Pregnancy and Childbirth, 8 MED. ANTHROPOL. Q. 25, 26 (1994); Ruhl, supra note 17,
at 110–13.
HALLIDAY, supra note 78.
David Garland argues that from the 1970s onwards in both the UK and US, new
forms of crime control mechanisms were employed based on the principle of hardline
policies of deterrence, predicative restraint, and incapacitation. These developments
occurred simultaneously with the ending of an era dominated by welfare state policies
and social democratic politics, as well as increased market freedom and the rise of neoliberalism. See generally DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND
SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (Oxford University Press 2001).
Jeanne Flavin & Lynn M. Paltrow, Punishing Pregnant Drug-Using Women: Defying
Law, Medicine, and Common Sense, 29 J. ADDICT. DIS. 231, 240 (2010).
See BORDO, supra note 17, at 71–98; MARTIN, supra note 74, at 54–67; ROTH, supra
note 121, at 6; Chavkin, supra note 17, at 194; Phelan, supra note 17, at 481; Ruhl,
supra note 17, at 107–09.

2020]

PUTTING THE FETUS FIRST

2. Sally—England, UK

197

283

Unlike certain state laws in the United States, laws in the United
Kingdom do not allow criminal convictions for the consumption of
284
controlled substances while pregnant. The fetus does not have legal
personality and cannot be the victim of a crime against the person; the
born-alive rule prevents a woman from being held criminally liable for
285
behavior that may cause harm to the fetus. Therefore, even if it is
established that the mother’s use of controlled substances harmed the
fetus, potentially following the birth of a drug-dependent baby, she has
not committed a criminal offense in relation to the consumption of the
substance, or harm that may have been caused to the fetus due to the
286
consumption of a substance. This principle was recently upheld in
287
Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority v. First-tier Tribunal. The
Court of Appeals’ ruling related to harm done to a child who was born
alive but with a long-term disability due to the alcohol consumption by
her birth mother during pregnancy. The child (CP) instituted a civil
case to claim compensation from the Criminal Injuries Compensation
Authority on the grounds that the disability she faces is due to an injury
sustained directly due to a crime of violence—her birth mother’s
283. “Sally” is not the defendant’s real name. While the case was heard in open court,
where her name was published, I have anonymized the case in line with requirements
imposed by the court to view the case. The anonymization is of the identity of the
defendant and all other parties involved in the case and includes withholding details
such as class, exact age, ethnicity, geographical location, and the court in which the
case was heard. As such no citations to the case are provided in this analysis.
284. It is not illegal to consume drugs in the UK, but criminal charges are attached to the
possession, sale, and production of certain substances, regardless of pregnancy status,
as well as allowing premises to be used for the consumption of drugs. See Misuse of
Drugs Act 1971, c. 38, §§ 4-6, 8-9A (UK); Prosecution Guidance: Drug Offences,
CROWN PROSECUTION SERV., https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/drug-offences
(last updated Mar. 12, 2019).
285. This excludes actions that are done with the intent to end the pregnancy but fall outside the Abortion Act 1967, c. 87 (Gr. Brit.). See supra note 135 (explaining the
Abortion Act exemptions). This also excludes actions that kill a child capable of being
born alive. In either case, the offenses of procuring a miscarriage and child destruction (respectively) have been committed. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying
text (explaining these offenses).
286. Unless it can be demonstrated that that substance was intentionally consumed in order to abort the fetus, or that the substance was consumed to kill a child capable of
being born alive, in which case, the offenses of procuring a miscarriage and child destruction may have been committed. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text
(explaining these offenses).
287. CP (A Child) v. First-Tier Tribunal (criminal injuries compensation) [214] EWCA
Civ. 1554 [2015] QB 459, 479.
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malicious administering of poison so as to endanger life or inflict
288
grievous bodily harm. Although this was a civil case, if ruling in favor
of CP the Court of Appeal would have been required to rule that CP’s
birth mother had committed a criminal offense in consuming alcohol
289
while pregnant in order for CP to recover compensation. However,
the court ruled against CP because at the time the alcohol was ingested,
CP was not “any other person,” as humans in utero do not have legal
290
personality. Upon being born alive, and thus becoming “any other
person” and so capable of being a victim of a crime of violence, the
administration of alcohol—the poison—had stopped. Therefore, the
crime was never committed against the baby when it had legal
291
personality and so the birth mother was not liable.
Based on the letter of the law, it is not possible for a woman to be
convicted of an offense due to her consumption of substances, illegal or
not, while pregnant, so long as the substance is not consumed with in292
tent to end the pregnancy or kill the child capable of being born alive.
However, as with Hayley’s case, recent prosecutions and convictions of
women who have been pregnant would suggest that criminal offenses
are being used to punish behavior women exhibit while pregnant. One
such example can be seen in the case of Sally, who was convicted on four
counts of concealment of birth (hereafter “concealment”). While in her
30s, Sally gave birth to four children after receiving no medical care at
any stage during her pregnancies. She claimed that all four were stillborn. The bodies were concealed in Sally’s bedroom for over ten years.
During the period of her pregnancies, Sally reportedly abused alcohol
and marijuana. She was described as having neglected her living children. After the bodies were discovered, Sally was prosecuted for and
pleaded guilty to four counts of concealment. For each count, Sally was
sentenced to a community order for two years and subject to supervision for the whole period.
Due to the decomposed state of the babies’ bodies, it was not possible to determine if the babies had been born alive or stillborn. Unlike
in Hayley’s case, there was no evidence to suggest that Sally had acted to
end her pregnancies. Therefore, the prosecution had little option but to
accept Sally’s account that she had experienced a spontaneous labor for
each child, who were all stillborn. In spite of the fact that Sally was not
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority at 463.
Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority at 463.
Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority at 474.
Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority at 474.
If either intent can be proven then the offenses of procuring a miscarriage or child
destruction may have been committed. See supra notes 22–23.
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convicted of any offense related to harming or killing the fetuses, the
judge specifically criticized Sally’s conduct during her pregnancy and
suggested that Sally was responsible for the poor outcomes of her pregnancies, “Whilst the circumstances and reasons for the stillborn births
will never fully be able to be established, your chaotic lifestyle choices,
including alcohol abuse and promiscuity at the time of your pregnancies
was such as to put the good health of any unborn child at risk.”
While evidence used in a sentencing hearing only impacts sentence
length and not culpability, the judge’s remarks express a belief that
Sally’s failure to maintain good health during her pregnancy may well
have caused the death of the infants. The suggestion that Sally is being
held culpable for the death of the children due to, among other
behaviors, her consumption of harmful substances, is strengthened
when considering the elements of the offense of concealment. The
offense of concealment is concerned only with the secret disposal of a
body to hide a child’s existence, and not with how or when the child
died. Therefore, there is arguably no requirement to comment on how
Sally behaved when she was pregnant because how or when the child
died has nothing to do with her conviction. The judge’s suggestion that
Sally’s lifestyle choices while pregnant potentially contributed to or
caused the stillbirths of her children indicates that the offense of
concealment is being used to punish Sally for her perceived harmful
behavior toward her unborn children, in addition to, or potentially
instead of, punishing the acts of concealing the bodies. Concealment
294
was used to punish her for her failing as a mother. While Sally was not
officially convicted of an offense due to her consumption of substances
while pregnant, the implication that such behavior is harmful and may
have caused the deaths of the fetuses suggests that the courts see such
behaviors by pregnant women as worthy of involvement of criminal
justice. Further evidence of this suggestion is apparent in the judge’s
remarks during sentencing that a mitigating factor in the case is that
Sally can no longer have children due to her age. If Sally can no longer
become pregnant, then she will no longer pose a risk to future unborn
children and therefore her risk does not need to be managed by criminal
295
justice. Unofficial involvement of criminal justice in cases of drug use
293. Without intent to end the pregnancy or kill the fetus, behavior that may be harmful
or cause death to the fetus is not illegal in England. See generally supra notes 19, 23–
24.
294. For further analysis of how concealment has been used to punish women for deviant
behavior that is beyond the scope of the offense, see Milne, Concealment of Birth,
supra note 27.
295. See generally supra notes 277–78.
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in pregnancy such as Sally’s demonstrate the extent to which the fetusfirst mentality has permeated the criminal justice system and is now an
acceptable feature of the application of criminal law, even where case law
296
exists to preclude such uses of law.
Such a reaction to a woman for failing to be a “good” enough
mother, to not put the fetus’s well-being before her own by abstaining
from drug use, reflects the fetus-first mentality. Perceptions and motherhood ideologies have limited room, if any, for drug users within their
narrative and construction of the “good” mother. Examples of the incompatibility between motherhood ideology and perception of drug users can be seen in a movement by campaigners to use financial rewards
to promote and encourage women who use drugs to be sterilized or take
297
long acting reversible contraception (LARC). Furthermore, there are
examples of cases from across states in the US where pregnant women
have been imprisoned or forced to undergo drug rehabilitation treatment due to their use of controlled substances or suspicion that they
may have used substances prior to becoming pregnant or will use them
298
in the future. Such reactions to substance users are troubling not only
because of the implications on the rights of pregnant women, but also
because of the negative impact of prison on pregnant women and their
299
fetuses. Instead of voluntary, supportive, free, and accessible treatment
296. Notably, the born-alive rule. See supra notes 18–21, 280–281.
297. While such campaigns have remained unofficial, promoted and funded by private
groups, they have continued to operate in the US and have seen support in the UK.
Paul Bois, This Woman Pays Drug Addicts to Get Sterilized, THE DAILY WIRE
(Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.dailywire.com/news/25334/woman-pays-drug-addictsget-sterilized-paul-bois; Charity Offers UK Drug Addicts £200 to Be Sterilised, BBC
NEWS (Oct. 17, 2010), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-11545519.
298. For example, the Wisconsin “Unborn Child Protection” Law, which was deemed
unconstitutional in May 2017. Federal Court Declares Wisconsin “Unborn Child Protection” Law Unconstitutional, NATIONAL ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT WOMEN (May
1, 2017 12:33 PM),
http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/blog/2017/05/
federal_court_declares_wiscons.php; JEANNE FLAVIN, OUR BODIES, OUR CRIMES:
THE POLICING OF WOMEN’S REPRODUCTION IN AMERICA 112–16 (2009); Flavin &
Paltrow, Punishing Pregnant Drug-Using Women, supra note 281, at 233; David C.
Brody & Heidee McMillin, Combating Fetal Substance Abuse and Governmental Foolhardiness Through Collaborative Linkages, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Common
Sense: Helping Women Help Themselves, 12 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L. J. 243, 247–56
(2001); Myrisha S. Lewis, Criminalizing Substance Abuse and Undermining Roe v.
Wade: The Tension Between Abortion Doctrine and the Criminalization of Prenatal
Substance Abuse, 23 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN AND THE L. 185, 189–98 (2017).
See also, Paltrow & Flavin, Forced Interventions, supra note 49.
299. See, e.g., Catherine Ingram Fogel, Pregnant Inmates Risk Factors and Pregnancy
Outcomes, 22 J. OBSTETRIC, GYNECOLOGIC, & NEONATAL NURSING 33, 33–34
(1993); E. Bard et al., Perinatal Health Care Services for Imprisoned Pregnant Women
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for pregnant drug users, there is limited support for women who use
controlled substances during their pregnancies, and instead a promotion
of methods that either prevent drug users from becoming pregnant or
forcibly prevent women from using drugs while pregnant (imprison300
ment or court-ordered rehabilitation).
Such response to drug users who are or may become pregnant, including criminal justice responses, provide further evidence for the fetus-first mentality. If the aim was to improve the health of pregnant
women who use drugs while pregnant and so support the health of the
fetus, then pregnancy and drug-use support would be advocated over
301
punishment. The message being conveyed is that the “good” mother
will not consume controlled substances: If you consume controlled substances then we will either prevent you from being a mother or punish
you for being the “bad” mother who takes drugs. Within this context,
the cases of Kimbrough and Sally can be seen as outcomes of wider policy and perceptions towards women who use controlled substances, as
well as towards women who are deemed to fall outside the ideology of
the “good” mother. These cases, among others, indicate a perceived need
to control and ultimately punish women for behavior deemed deviant
for mothers.
VI. Implications of the Fetus-first Mentality
Two types of cases have been presented to illustrate the influence of
the fetus-first mentality on legal interpretations of women’s behavior
while they are pregnant. In each case, prosecutors and judges have interpreted or attempted to interpret the law to hold women criminally
liable in instances where harm to the fetus has occurred or it is perceived
that it could have occurred as a result of the pregnant woman’s behavior. It is not the intention of this Article to argue that the criminal justice systems were wrong to prosecute, convict, and punish these women.
Instead, my aim is to outline how the fetus-first mentality is reflected in
and Associated Outcomes: A Systematic Review, 16 BMC PREGNANCY AND
CHILDBIRTH 285, 286 (2016); Caitlin McMillen Dowell et al., Determinants of
Infant Mortality for Children of Women Prisoners: A Longitudinal Linked Data Study,
18 BMC PREGNANCY AND CHILDBIRTH 202, 214–17 (2018); G. G. Ferszt & J. G.
Clarke, Health Care of Pregnant Women in U.S. State Prisons, 23 J. HEALTH CARE
POOR UNDERSERVED 557, 557–59 (2012).
300. See Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, supra note 262, at 1007–09; Flavin & Paltrow
Punishing Pregnant Drug-Using Women, supra note 281, at 232–34; FLAVIN, supra
note 298, at 111–12.
301. See SOLINGER, PREGNANCY AND POWER, supra note 273, at 234–35.
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these cases. In so doing, it is important to consider the potential consequences these cases have beyond the impact on the women involved.
This Part of the Article outlines the potential ramifications of protecting
fetuses through criminal law by considering the results of criminalizing
pregnant women on the well-being of fetuses, the impact on women’s
302
rights and freedoms, and on perceptions of motherhood.
One justification for laws regulating women’s behavior while pregnant is that they result in greater protection for fetuses and therefore
303
improved fetal health outcomes. This is often cited as the intended
304
outcome of law by policy makers and criminal justice professionals. If
the laws actually improved fetal outcomes, perhaps there would be a justification for regulating women’s behavior, as in the cases outlined
305
above. However, one of the critiques of criminalizing the conduct of
women while pregnant is that this use of law has failed to protect fetuses
from harm or death, as argued below.
One of the challenges of demonstrating the positive impact of fetal
protection laws is that it is very difficult to determine whether the actions of pregnant women directly lead to harm to or death of the fetus.
For example, in instances where illegal substances have been consumed
and the pregnancy ends in a miscarriage or stillbirth, frequently the
306
cause of fetal death is unknown. Advocates argue that the socioeconomic background of the pregnant woman has a greater impact on maternal and fetal health than maternal behavior. Deprivation has a dramatic impact upon women’s decisions about their health and life during
307
pregnancy, such as whether they can afford to access healthcare.
Within the US context, access to available healthcare and affordability
of health insurance have been noted to be a significant problem for poor
302. The analysis in this section will focus on the US, as a greater level of critique of using
criminal law to regulate and sanction pregnant women has been developed due to the
development of fetal protection laws in these jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the arguments apply to England and Wales due to the way legislation has been interpreted
and used in cases, as outlined in this Article.
303. See generally, Thom et al., supra note 4.
304. Carolyn B. Ramsey, Restructuring the Debate Over Fetal Homicide Laws, 67 OHIO ST.
L. J. 721, 734–35 (2006).
305. Such a statement needs to be considered in line with the arguments made below
about the impact on the rights of women, as argued in Part VI of this Article.
306. Kellett, supra note 254; Mohapatra, supra note 266, at 249–50; Frank et al., supra
note 254.
307. See Erin D. Kampschmidt, Prosecuting Women for Drug Use During Pregnancy: The
Criminal Justice System Should Step Out and the Affordable Care Act Should Step Up,
25 HEALTH MATRIX: J. L.-MED. 487, 506–09 (2015); Steven J. Ondersma et al.,
Prenatal Drug Exposure and Social Policy: The Search for an Appropriate Response, 5
CHILD MALTREATMENT 93, 105 (2000); See generally Frank et al., supra note 254.
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pregnant women; there are also racial and ethnic disparities in insurance
308
status. Lack of access to healthcare may be linked to women’s behavior during pregnancy—for example they may not seek advice regarding
substance use. However, the connection is indirect and a result of poverty and deprivation, rather than intent to harm the fetus.
Even when there is clear evidence that maternal behavior caused
309
harm to the fetus, such as with fetal alcohol syndrome, it is still not
necessarily the case that legal sanctions against women will improve the
well-being of the fetus. In fact, legal sanctions can lead to worse fetal
outcomes. Many pregnant women who have been subject to criminal
justice involvement in their pregnancies have been reported to the police
310
by hospital staff. The initiation of criminal justice involvement by
medical professionals has led to fears that this may damage the doctorpatient relationships and lead women who may be at risk of being crim311
inalized to avoid prenatal care altogether. Such concerns have been
mirrored by medical associations and groups, such as The American
312
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, and groups primarily
concerned with the health and rights of children, such as the American
313
Academy of Pediatrics and the Center for the Future of Children. As
with poverty, lack of prenatal care is a leading factor in poor pregnancy
314
outcomes. Criminal sanctions, rather than improving fetal outcomes,
can lead to women foregoing prenatal care or deciding to terminate a
308. Fentiman, supra note 266, at 587–92.
309. See generally Alcohol and Pregnancy: Preventing and Managing Fetal Alcohol Spectrum
Disorders, BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (June 2007), https://www.bma.org.uk/
collective-voice/policy-and-research/public-and-population-health/alcohol/alcoholand-pregnancy (last updated Feb. 2016).
310. Paltrow & Flavin, Forced Interventions, supra note 49; this was the case with Hayley
and Patel, as outlined above.
311. Jessica M. Boudreaux & John W. Thompson, Maternal-Fetal Rights and Substance
Abuse: Gestation Without Representation, 43 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 137, 140
(2015).
312. Comm. On Health Care for Underserved Women, AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS
AND GYNECOLOGISTS, Opinion No. 473: Substance Abuse Reporting and
Pregnancy: The Role of the Obstetrician–Gynecologist (January 2011 [Reaffirmed
2014]),
available
at
https://www.acog.org/-/media/Committee-Opinions/
Committee-on-Health-Care-for-Underserved-Women/
co473.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20170224T0820264139 (last visited Mar. 1, 2016).
313. CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, PUNISHING WOMEN FOR THEIR BEHAVIOR
DURING PREGNANCY: AN APPROACH THAT UNDERMINES WOMEN’S HEALTH AND
CHILDREN’S INTEREST 8 (2000), https://www.reproductiverights.org/document/
punishing-women-for-their-behavior-during-pregnancy-an-approach-thatundermines-womens-heal.
314. See Kampschmidt, supra note 307, at 506–09; Ondersma et al., supra note 307, at
105; see generally Frank et al., supra note 254.
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315

pregnancy out of fear of legal ramifications. Therefore, one of the indirect consequences of the use of criminal law to regulate and sanction
pregnant women could be harm or death to the fetus due to the pregnant woman deciding to not seek medical assistance or to terminate her
316
pregnancy.
Criminal sanctions for substance abuse during pregnancy can also
lead to worse health outcomes for the pregnant woman. It is widely argued that medical treatment and support for women with substance
abuse issues would be far more appropriate, safer, and result in better
317
outcomes for both women and their unborn children. Treatment of
pregnant drug users would require financial commitment, as would
providing adequate reproductive services to women throughout their
lives, with specific targeted treatment for those who are most vulnerable.
There is a lack of available treatment programs for pregnant drug users
across the US due to stigma, lack of financial resources, private health
insurance companies refusing to cover alcohol and drug treatment, and
many rehabilitation programs’ inability or unwillingness to provide
pregnant women with both addiction treatment and prenatal medical
318
care. As Linda Fentiman, a specialist in health law and criminal law,
argues, it is far easier and far cheaper to point to a vulnerable woman
with a positive drug test who has given birth to a stillborn child and announce that it is she—and she alone—who is to blame for the death of
319
her child.
One of the most-cited negative implications of using criminal law
to sanction the behavior of women while pregnant is the impact upon
the rights of all women, whether pregnant or not. One of the key critiques of fetal protection laws raised by feminists in the US is that the
laws may threaten women’s ability to access abortion, as the determination that a fetus is a legal “person” allows for the fetus to be identified as

315. Murphy, supra note 36, at 873–74.
316. This point is made with recognition of the increasing control and regulation placed
on abortion in many states across America, resulting in a near ban on abortion in
some states. See supra note 138.
317. See generally Emma Cave, Drink and Drugs in Pregnancy: Can the Law Prevent Avoidable Harm to the Future Child?, 8 MED. L. INT’L 165 (2007); Kenneth A. De Ville &
Loretta M. Kopelman, Fetal Protection in Wisconsin’s Revised Child Abuse Law: Right
Goal, Wrong Remedy, 27 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 332 (1999); Maternal Rights and Fetal
Wrongs: The Case Against the Criminalization of Fetal Abuse, 101 HARV. L. REV. 994
(1988); Murphy, supra note 36; Adams, supra note 262; Mohapatra, supra note 266;
Fentiman, supra note 266; Brody & McMillin, supra note 298; FLAVIN, supra note
298; Kampschmidt, supra note 307.
318. See Suppé, supra note 229, at 67–73.
319. Fentiman, supra note 266, at 541.
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an autonomous entity with rights equivalent and in opposition to the
320
rights of the pregnant woman. Many of the restrictions on abortion in
the US have been implemented on the basis of states’ rights to protect
321
the life of the fetus. While it has been argued that providing the fetus
with legal personality would not be a significant enough legal challenge
322
alone, concern has been raised that legal protection for the fetus will
contribute to a pro-life cultural message that portrays abortion as im323
moral within a wider message of the “culture of life.”
Beyond access to abortion, other implications of fetal protection
laws have been identified by scholars, notably that the laws are
discriminatory against women and interfere with women’s rights to
324
liberty and privacy. By sanctioning the behavior of women while
pregnant, as in the cases outlined above, the state is depriving women of
their rights because of their pregnancy status. This is due to the fact that
320. See generally Anannya Bhattacharjee, Private Fists and Public Force: Race, Gender, And
Sexuality, in POLICING THE NATIONAL BODY: SEX, RACE, AND CRIMINALIZATION 1–
54 (Jael Miriam Silliman & Anannya Bhattacharjee eds. 2002); Amanda K. Bruchs,
Clash of Competing Interests: Can the Unborn Victims of Violence Act and Over Thirty
Years of Settled Abortion Law Co-exist Peacefully?, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 133 (2004);
Dawn Johnsen, From Driving to Drugs: Governmental Regulation of Pregnant Women’s
Lives after Webster, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 179 (1989); Tara Kole & Laura Kadetsky,
The Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 215 (2002); Lisa Mclennan Brown, Feminist Theory and the Erosion of Women’s Reproductive Rights: The Implications of Fetal Personhood Laws and in Vitro Fertilization, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER &
SOC. POL’Y & L. 87 (2005); Jean Reith Schroedel et al., Women’s Rights and Fetal Personhood in Criminal Law, 7 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 89 (2000); Folger, supra
note 33; MacKinnon, supra note 77; Paltrow, supra note 262; De Ville & Kopelman,
supra note 317.
321. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Service, 492 U.S. 490, 504–07 (1989) (deciding that the Supreme Court did not need to consider the constitutionality of the
preamble of Missouri’s state laws, which stated that the life of each human being begins at conception, as it is not used to justify any abortion regulation otherwise invalid under Roe v. Wade. As such, the Court held that states have the right to determine
when life begins as a value judgement.); Clarke D. Forsythe & Keith Arago, Roe v.
Wade & the Legal Implications of State Constitutional Personhood Amendments, 30
NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS PUB. POL’Y 273, 284–95 (2016); Ramsey, supra note 304,
at 726–43.
322. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920, 923–26 (1973); Michael C. Dorf, How Abortion Politics Impedes Clear Thinking
on
Other
Issues
Involving Fetuses,
FINDLAW
(May
28,
2003),
http://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/how-abortion-politics-impedes-clearthinking-on-other-issues-involving-fetuses.html.
323. Ramsey, supra note 304; Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws: Legislating in the
Culture of Life, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 753 (2006).
324. Johnsen, supra note 320, at 189; Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions:
What’s Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 9, 31–32 (1987); see also
BORDO, supra note 17; FLAVIN, supra note 298; HALLIDAY, supra note 78.
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the behavior would not be sanctioned if committed while not pregnant.
Dawn Johnsen, a constitutional law scholar and professor, argues that
such state prescription of behavior deprives women of the right to
control their lives during pregnancy—a fundamental right of liberty and
privacy, as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, and
325
specifically the Fourteenth Amendment. Women have the right to
refuse medical intervention and to be free from criminal or civil liability
for their conduct during pregnancy, based on the common law and
constitutional rights of privacy, bodily integrity, and personal decisionmaking. These rights include the freedom from coercion of medical
treatment, freedom in choice for a family life, the right to selfdetermination, the right to non-subordination, the freedom from bodily
invasion, and appropriation of the body for the purpose of another (the
326
fetus). And yet, many US states have demonstrated that they are
prepared to prioritize the protection of the fetus over the pregnant
327
woman’s rights to bodily autonomy and integrity.
In England and Wales, as outlined above, women have no right to
abortion, only the right to ask a doctor if they will be granted an
328
abortion; as such, women are restricted from the fundamental right to
control their own bodies in relation to deciding to continue a
pregnancy. It should be noted, however, that while abortion is legally
restricted, the reality is that the procedure is widely available and free for
all women who are entitled to free treatment under the National Health
329
Service, and there currently appears to be little to no appetite to
330
reduce women’s access to abortion. Nevertheless, as recent legal cases

325. Johnsen, supra note 320, at 191, 197–201.
326. Gallagher, supra note 324, at 29; see also BORDO, supra note 17; FLAVIN, supra note
298.
327. HALLIDAY, supra note 78, at 7–39.
328. Sheldon, supra note 162, at 13–14; Sheldon, supra note 23, at 342–46.
329. Jessica Potter, Who Has to Pay for the NHS and When?, THE CONVERSATION (Feb. 6,
2018, 1:00 AM), http://theconversation.com/who-has-to-pay-for-the-nhs-and-when91344; PUB. HEALTH ENG., NHS ENTITLEMENTS: MIGRANT HEALTH GUIDE (Dec.
19,
2019),
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/nhs-entitlements-migrant-healthguide#free-for-all. Primary care is free of charge for all registered patients and temporary patients (defined as a patient who is in the area for more than 24 hours and less
than three months). Secondary care is free of charge for UK residents and those living
lawfully in the UK on a properly settled basis for the time being.
330. However, Members of Parliament occasionally raise the prospect of reducing the
term limit for abortions that are not due to risk of maternal death or fetal abnormality. Maya Oppenheim, Jeremy Hunt Criticised for Taking ‘Cavalier Approach’ to Women’s Needs After Abortion Time Limit Comments, THE INDEPENDENT (June 10, 2019,
3:15 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/jeremy-hunt-abortiontime-limit-tory-leadership-contest-conservative-party-a8952306.html.
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analyzed above indicate, there is a trend towards limiting women’s
rights while pregnant. Connection is made within these cases as to
women’s harm to fetuses and rights to abortion, as apparent in
sentencing remarks made by the Judge in Hayley’s case, “There is no
mitigation available to you by reference to the Abortion Act, whatever
view one takes of its provisions, which are wrongly so liberally construed
in practice as to make abortion available essentially on demand prior to
24 weeks, subject to medical practitioners’ approval.”
British advocates, such as Emeritus Professor Margaret Brazier, a
leading scholar of medical law and ethics, have argued that changing the
law to require pregnant women to act in the best interests of their fetuses would remove behavioral choice and prioritize the needs of the fetus
331
over the pregnant woman. Introducing law to protect the interests of
the fetus would result in undue restrictions on women’s liberty, auton332
omy, and privacy, as protected under human rights. Every choice in a
pregnant woman’s life would be subject to scrutiny and so she would be
rendered vulnerable to coercion by others. For example, if a woman is
advised by her doctor that a medical procedure is required and legal
sanctions were a potential consequence of a woman deciding to not follow medical advice, then her ability to “choose” to have the procedure is
333
removed.
In presenting a critical assessment of the impact of the fetus-first
mentality on women’s rights, I am not advocating that women should
not be prosecuted for any criminal offense committed while pregnant.
Instead, I am advocating that criminal law should be applied equally to
all people—it should be applied to people who are pregnant the same as
it is applied to people who are not pregnant. Therefore, differential application of criminal law or sentencing on the basis of a woman being
pregnant or that she may become pregnant intrudes on fundamental
rights of privacy and bodily autonomy, protected in the US under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of liberty and in the UK under the
334
Human Rights Act. Without such protections, women would be
forced to live in fear of being pregnant, or even being fertile, as the basis
under which the government may impose extensive burdens on their

331. Margaret Brazier, Liberty, Responsibility, Maternity, 52 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 359
(1999).
332. Human Rights Act 1998 c. 42 (Eng.).
333. EMILY JACKSON, REGULATING REPRODUCTION: LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND
AUTONOMY (2001); Michael Thomson, After re S, 2 MED. L. REV. 127 (1994).
334. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1; Human Rights Act 1998, c.42 (UK); see also Oppenheim, supra note 330.
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335

freedoms. Consequently, sanctioning women for conduct while pregnant reinforces the traditional sex-based discrimination by disadvantaging women based on their reproductive capacity, in spite of the fact that
having a child involves a woman taking on an important function neces336
sary for the survival of the human species. No other person in any
other circumstance is expected to put the well-being of someone else before themselves in the way that pregnant women are increasingly re337
quired to for their fetuses. As Howard Minkoff, a leading American
obstetrician and gynecologist, and Lynn M. Paltrow, Executive Director
and founder of the National Advocates for Pregnant Women, a nonprofit organization focused on human rights and civil liberties of pregnant women, argue, if a child needed a bone marrow transplant to survive, and the only available donor was the child’s father, it would never
be considered an acceptable intervention by the state to legally compel
338
that man to donate. However, when an equivalent situation occurs for
a woman in relation to her fetus, as with an expectation that she will
have a caesarean section, or not consume certain substances, repeatedly,
in different jurisdictions, the state is willing to intervene to force women
339
to comply. As Minkoff and Paltrow argue, “the State has now endowed the fetus with greater rights than its living siblings and, for that
340
matter, any born person of any age.”
A final concern of the fetus-first mentality in the context of criminal law is that it represents state-sanctioned motherhood. If the state indicates that it is prepared to curb the behavior of pregnant women
through threat of imprisonment for the sake of the health of the fetus,
“a state legitimized form of motherhood” is effectively being imposed
341
on all women. As outlined in Part II, the myths of motherhood have
been recognized as operating in social and cultural contexts and having a
discriminatory impact on women. The operation of such ideology within criminal justice has equally discriminatory implications. Most notably, who is perceived to be the “good” mother, and, more importantly,
335. Johnsen, supra note 320, at 201.
336. Johnsen, supra note 32, at 620–25; see also Dawn Johnsen, A New Threat to Pregnant
Women’s Autonomy, 17 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 33 (1987); Michelle Oberman, The
Control of Pregnancy and the Criminalization of Femaleness, 7 BERKELEY J. GENDER L.
& JUST. 1, 2 (1992).
337. See Johnsen, A New Threat to Pregnant Women’s Autonomy, supra note 336.
338. H. Minkoff & Lynn M. Paltrow, Melissa Rowland and the Rights of Pregnant Women,
104 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1234, 1235 (2004).
339. Id.
340. Id. at 1235.
341. April L. Cherry, The Detention, Confinement, and Incarceration of Pregnant Women
for the Benefit of Fetal Health, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 149, 198 (2007).
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the “bad” mother who needs to be controlled and regulated through
criminal law.
Feminists have criticized fetal homicide laws on the basis that when
implemented, legislatures were less concerned with the welfare of the fetus—evident in the detrimental impacts outlined above—and more
concerned with the behavior of women and mothers. For example,
Rickie Solinger, a historian focused on reproductive politics, race, class,
and motherhood, argues that if the state valued women and children,
then it would fund necessary medical treatment for pregnant women,
such as drug rehabilitation, and assist women to achieve good health
342
during pregnancy. As such, Solinger argues, this state-intervention
says far more about the “type” of woman that “should” be a mother.
While Solinger’s critique is focused on the criminalization of pregnant
drug users, her argument can be applied to other activities and behaviors
343
by women while pregnant that may be deemed harmful to the fetus.
State-sponsored coercion of pregnant women’s behavior “compels women who desire children to reorganize their lives in accordance with judi344
cially defined norms of behavior.” Furthermore, laws designed to protect fetuses are applied discriminatorily; in the US, women of color and
poor women are overrepresented among those arrested or subject to
345
equivalent deprivations of liberty. Such women are furthest away from
the “ideal” mother represented in the myths of motherhood.
V. Conclusion
The application of the fetus-first mentality within criminal law has
resulted in dangerous legal developments that challenge women’s rights,
while, evidently, doing little to protect fetuses. The implications are the
same whether laws have been specifically enacted to protect fetuses, as in
the US, or if such legal protection is technically not a feature of the

342. SOLINGER, supra note 273, at 236.
343. See also FLAVIN, supra note 298; ROBERTS, supra note 253 (noting decisions by some
courts to require women who take drugs to take long acting reversible contraception
to prevent pregnancy, which indicates that the concern lies in the woman’s ability to
get pregnant and her suitability as a mother, rather than the desire to treat her drug
use to enable her to be a mother. If the focus of intervention was the latter then
treatment for drug-users in general would be the focus of the criminal justice system
and the state).
344. Johnsen, supra note 32, at 612.
345. Paltrow, supra note 262; Paltrow & Flavin, Forced Intervention, supra note 49;
ROBERTS, supra note 253; Mohapatra, supra note 266; Fentiman, supra note 266;
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criminal law, as in England and Wales. Criminalization of women who
fall short of the ideals of motherhood is the most extreme aspect of the
governance of pregnancy, outlined in Part II. Self-regulation and maternal sacrifice are defining characteristics of the myths of motherhood and
are perceived to demonstrate a woman’s “love” and devotion to her fetus
346
and future child. As illustrated by the CDC’s message about women’s
consumption of alcohol and NHS Greater Glasgow & Clyde’s report on
347
preconception health, public messages encourage women to selfregulate for the good of their unborn child, even if not yet conceived
and if the woman has no plans or desires to conceive. It is clear from the
content and tone of these public health messages that organizations such
as the CDC consider it appropriate and acceptable to deliver such messages to all women of reproductive age; this suggests that there is a general acceptance of these messages and the ideologies that lie behind
them—the principle that women should be prepared to self-regulate
and deprive themselves of things they desire for the betterment of a future child. That is not to say that either the CDC’s or NHS Greater
Glasgow & Clyde’s messages were accepted without contestation, as a
348
number of commenters were highly critical of the press releases, and a
349
social media storm ensued. The CDC later amended the infographic
350
while standing by the message. Nevertheless, the nature of messages
such as these points to the wide acceptability of the principle that women should do what is best for the fetus. The criminalization of numerous
women in the US and the small number of women in England, such as
Hayley and Sally, can be seen as extreme examples of a wider social and
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cultural movement towards state regulation of pregnancy. Thus, using
criminal law to sanction the behavior of pregnant women should be understood as being at the extreme end of a spectrum of the regulation of
women’s behavior through public health messages, medical “advice” and
intervention, and social and cultural expectations.
Nevertheless, one of the challenges in this area of law is how to balance the rights of the pregnant woman with the protection of the fetus.
There is ongoing debate as to whether a fetus has rights and should be
351
protected under law. Engaging in this philosophical and ethical debate
is outside of the scope of this Article; however, as analyzed above, it is
important to note the practical implications of enshrining fetal rights in
law—notably the negative consequences for women’s rights and the limited gains in outcomes for fetuses. Supporting women—not just
through their pregnancies and reproductive choices, but also more wide352
ly—is likely to have a far greater impact on the well-being of fetuses.
This is particularly true for women living in poverty, who are therefore
at a greater risk of negative pregnancy outcomes. However, such an approach would require governments to acknowledge that their attitudes
and practices towards women’s rights are limited and are causing harm,
and to be prepared to invest in services to support women. Sadly, labeling women as “bad” mothers who belong in prison is the far easier option.
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